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L’AMOUR FOR FOUR: POLYGYNY, POLYAMORY, AND THE
STATE’S COMPELLING ECONOMIC INTEREST IN
NORMATIVE MONOGAMY
ABSTRACT
Some Americans are changing the way they pair up, but others aren’t
satisfied with pairs. In the last few years, while voters, legislatures, and
judiciaries have expanded marriage in favor of same-sex couples, some are
hoping for expansion in a different dimension. These Americans, instead of
concerning themselves with gender restrictions, want to remove numerical
restrictions on marriage currently imposed by states. These people call
themselves polyamorists, and they are seeking rights for their multiple-partner
relationships. Of course, polygamy is nothing new for the human species. Some
scientists believe that polygamy is actually the most natural human
relationship, and history is littered with a variety of approaches to polygamous
relations. Only in recent centuries has society’s preference for monogamy
developed, yet that preference has proven robust, as most Western
governments vehemently support monogamy as the only marital option.
This Comment explores polygyny and polyamory in the United States and
walks through the traditional legal, political, and sociological arguments for
and against polygamy. While most polygamy throughout the world stems from
cultural or religious bases, this Comment primarily focuses on freely
entered-into polygamy. The traditional human rights arguments against
cultural- and religious-based polygamy do not necessarily apply to
coercion-free polyamory. While some claim the absence of coercion leaves the
state without a compelling reason to ban polygamous marriage, this Comment
disagrees and finds several compelling reasons for states to favor monogamy.
Alarmingly, in the face of challenges by would-be polygamous couples,
states are unable to articulate exactly what interest they have in normative
monogamy. Attorneys defending states’ polygamy laws usually rely on
historical or administrative reasons, essentially claiming that monogamy
should hold because that’s what we have always done, and it would be too
hard to change. These typical arguments sell monogamy short. This Comment
proposes other, more dynamic reasons that states should continue to support
normative monogamy, reasons that have thus far been ignored by the legal
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world. Normative monogamy plays a far greater role in the development of
Western society than states have argued. In fact, social science research shows
that normative monogamy makes members of society more productive by
encouraging long-term investments instead of short-term, mating-focused
expenditures of resources. This natural shift in priorities among the
monogamous has led to radical advancement in societies that practice
normative monogamy. Monogamy’s contribution to society has been largely
ignored by the legal world and unargued before courts deciding the merits of
laws proscribing polygamy; yet normative monogamy’s role in the
advancement of society is the single most compelling interest that states have.
This Comment advances that previously ignored interest.
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 2095
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INTRODUCTION
Terisa Greenan and her boyfriend, Matt, are enjoying a rare day
of Seattle sun, sharing a beet carpaccio on the patio of a local
restaurant. Matt holds Terisa’s hand, as his 6-year-old son squeezes
in between the couple to give Terisa a kiss. His mother, Vera, looks
over and smiles; she’s there with her boyfriend, Larry. Suddenly it
starts to rain, and the group must move inside. In the process, they
rearrange themselves: Matt’s hand touches Vera’s leg. Terisa gives
Larry a kiss. The child, seemingly unconcerned, puts his arms around
his mother and digs into his meal.
Terisa and Matt and Vera and Larry—along with Scott, who’s
also at this dinner—are not swingers, per se; they aren’t pursuing
casual sex. Nor are they polygamists of the sort portrayed on HBO’s
Big Love; they aren’t religious, and they don’t have multiple wives.
But they do believe in “ethical nonmonogamy,” or engaging in
loving, intimate relationships with more than one person—based
upon the knowledge and consent of everyone involved. They are
polyamorous, to use the term of art applied to multiple-partner
families like theirs, and they wouldn’t want to live any other way.1

Terisa, Matt, Vera, Larry, and Scott are hardly alone in eschewing
monogamy for polygamy. While polygamy is virtually nonexistent in modern
mainstream Western culture, the majority of cultures on earth today still
practice polygamy.2 Even in the United States, polygamy may be more
common than one might think. A recent study from the University of Michigan
found that approximately four percent of the adult population participates in
consensually nonmonogamous relationships.3 This means that there may be
10 to 12 million polyamorists4 in the United States,5 which is enough of a
1 Jessica Bennett, Polyamory: The Next Sexual Revolution?, NEWSWEEK (July 28, 2009, 8:00 PM),
http://www.newsweek.com/polyamory-next-sexual-revolution-82053.
2 George Peter Murdock, World Ethnographic Sample, 59 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 664, 686 & tbl.2
(1957) (“[M]onogamy is characteristic of about 24 percent of the world’s societies, polyandry of 1 percent,
and polygyny of 75 percent . . . .”). Amongst primates, monogamy may be even more rare. One study has
found that only three percent of primate species are monogamous. See Agustin Fuentes, Re-Evaluating
Primate Monogamy, 100 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 890, 900 (1998).
3 See Terri D. Conley et al., The Fewer the Merrier?: Assessing Stigma Surrounding Consensually
Non-monogamous Romantic Relationships, 13 ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3 & n.1, 12 (2013)
(conducting a study of 1,101 sample participants where forty-seven “identified [themselves] as currently
engaging in a consensual nonmonogamous relationship”).
4 Polyamory is a subset of polygamy involving multiple males and multiple females. This is to be
contrasted with polygyny, which involves multiple females but only one male. For further analysis of the
differences between polyamory and polygyny, see infra Part I.
5 Olga
Khazan, Multiple Lovers, Without Jealousy, ATLANTIC (July 21, 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2014/07/multiple-lovers-no-jealousy/374697/. Finding an accurate
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population to lead University of Michigan researchers to conclude that
polyamorists’ “sheer numerical size . . . suggests the potential to start a social
movement for civil rights.”6
In actuality, the push for polygamist rights in the United States has been
underway for more than a century. In 1879, the United States Supreme Court
unanimously affirmed the criminal conviction of a practicing polygamist in
Reynolds v. United States, declaring polygamy to be “odious.”7 In Reynolds,
Chief Justice Morrison Waite described the West’s long history of
criminalizing polygamy, dating back to the statute of James I in the Eleventh
Century, declaring, “From that day to this we think it may safely be said there
never has been a time in any State of the Union when polygamy has not been
an offence against society.”8 Since that time, federal courts have consistently
rejected constitutional challenges to polygamy laws.9
However, the nineteenth-century Supreme Court cases upholding laws
banning polygamy also would have upheld now-arcane laws restricting
marriage on divorce and gender bases. For example, in the 1885 case of
Murphy v. Ramsey, the Supreme Court upheld the denial of voting privileges to
polygamists under the Edmunds Act.10 But in doing so, the Court uses
language indicating a much narrower view of marriage:
[N]o legislation can be supposed more wholesome and necessary in
the founding of a free, self-governing commonwealth . . . than that
which seeks to establish it on the basis of the idea of the family, as
consisting in and springing from the union for life of one man and
number of polyamorous relationships in the United States has proven to be a difficult task for researchers, due
in part to the newness and fluidity of the concept. Other research has suggested that the number is far smaller,
at perhaps 500,000 in the United States. See Bennett, supra note 1.
6 Conley et al., supra note 3, at 3.
7 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879).
8 Id. at 165.
9 See, e.g., Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 334, 341 (1890) (unanimously rejecting a First Amendment
challenge to a law requiring voters to swear they were not bigamists or polygamists by stating that “[f]ew
crimes are more pernicious to the best interests of society” than polygamy); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15,
35, 37 (1885) (rejecting challenge to law prohibiting cohabitating polygamists from voting); Potter v. Murray
City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1070–72 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding that Utah is justified in banning plural marriage
because of its compelling interest in protecting monogamous marriage); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 650 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he proposition that polygamy can be criminalized . . . remains
good law.”); cf. Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1217–18 (D. Utah 2013) (holding that Utah “has an
important interest in regulating marriage, but only insofar as marriage is understood as a legal status,” thus
overturning Utah’s criminalizing of polygamy (quoting State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 771 (Utah 2006)
(Durham, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
10 114 U.S. at 35, 37.

PORTER GALLEYSPROOFS

2015]

5/19/2015 2:36 PM

L’AMOUR FOR FOUR

2097

one woman in the holy estate of matrimony; the sure foundation of all
that is stable and noble in our civilization; the best guaranty of that
reverent morality which is the source of all beneficent progress in
social and political improvement.11

Despite the Murphy Court’s sanctioning of legislation requiring “union[s] for
life,” we now conceive of divorce as being something akin to a fundamental
right.12 And, despite Murphy’s statement that marriage is between “one man
and one woman,”13 nearly all legal prognosticators agree that the Supreme
Court will soon declare same-sex marriage to be a right.14 Are Murphy’s
statements condemning polygamy bound to suffer the same fate? This
Comment attempts to answer that question by exploring polygamy and
polygamy laws in the United States.
An interesting, yet often overlooked, group of American polygamists
consists of those who seek relationships not because of religious or cultural
reasons but because of a personal desire to have a nonmonogamous
relationship. The bulk of American polygamy law is intertwined with the First
Amendment’s Establishment Clause rationale and polygamy’s base presence in
several faiths. In Reynolds and Murphy, for example, the polygamy law
challengers were Mormons.15 In fact, many nineteenth-century polygamy laws,
including the Edmunds Act, were targeted at members of the Mormon
Church.16 Today, the usual polygamy tale involves not only Mormons but also
Islamic and African immigrants who carried their polygamous marriages with
them.17 Thus, most laypersons (and most legal scholars, according to one

11

Id. at 45.
See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 372, 382–83 (1971) (holding that the Due Process
Clause guarantees ability to dissolve marriages without regard to ability to pay for fees and costs associated
with divorce proceedings). See generally LESLIE JOAN HARRIS, JUNE CARBONE & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, FAMILY
LAW 270 (5th ed. 2014) (“In the 20-year period between 1965 and 1985, every state passed legislation
recognizing some form of no-fault ground for divorce.”).
13 114 U.S. at 45.
14 See, e.g., Keith E. Sealing, Polygamists Out of the Closet: Statutory and State Constitutional
Prohibitions Against Polygamy Are Unconstitutional Under the Free Exercise Clause, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
691 (2001) (citing various scholars who agree that same-sex marriage is a right).
15 See 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879); see also Murphy, 114 U.S. at 28.
16 Shayna M. Sigman, Everything Lawyers Know About Polygamy Is Wrong, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 101, 127–34 (2006). For an additional overview on this point, see generally Mary K. Campbell, Mr.
Peay’s Horses: The Federal Response to Mormon Polygamy, 1854–1887, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 29
(2001); Elizabeth Harmer-Dionne, Note, Once a Peculiar People: Cognitive Dissonance and the Suppression
of Mormon Polygamy as a Case Study Negating the Belief-Action Distinction, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1295, 1319–
40 (1998).
17 See Sealing, supra note 14, at 692–94.
12
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professor)18 assume the discussion about polygamy interests only those whose
religion teaches polygamy, all of whom live on the fringe of society, far away
from most good, law-abiding, taxpaying citizens.
But, as Terisa, Matt, Vera, Larry, and Scott show, many polygamous
relationships are developing not through culturally or religiously engrained
teachings but through natural feelings of love for multiple persons.19 Yet most
discussions on the legality of polygamous marriages are based solely on the
Free Exercise Clause and result from polygamy’s historic ties to religion.20
This Comment claims that the most worthy challenge to monogamy laws will
come from coercion-free polygamous arrangements.
To arrive at this conclusion, this Comment must first consider conventional
legal arguments about religious-based polygyny. Part I of this Comment
defines and analyzes the various types of polygamous relationships, as well as
the law’s historic treatment of those relationships in America, and will briefly
review the scant literature on the rights of polygamous individuals and groups.
Part II then considers the state’s interest in regulating religious-based
polygamy. It will also outline the state’s most compelling interest in regulating
marriage, namely to protect potential victims from harm. The flood of
information over the past two decades presents a new compelling state interest
with regard to religious-based polygamy, enough to seemingly defeat any Free
Exercise Clause challenge. Part II concludes, however, that the harm present in
religious-based polygamy, which is used as the basis to defeat these free
exercise claims, is different from the potential harm in coercion-free
polyamory.
Part III seeks to determine whether states have a compelling interest in
restricting marriage to two people even in the absence of coercion. In
undertaking this analysis, this Comment looks to relevant social science to
consider the prudence of favoring monogamy. Ultimately, Part III determines
18 Sigman, supra note 16, at 102 (“Everything judges, legislators, policymakers, and legal scholars think
they know about polygamy is based on faulty assumptions and presumptions, conceptions and
misconceptions.”).
19 See Bennett, supra note 1.
20 The debate on religion-based polygamy will be discussed in Part II and mainly involves competing
concepts of the right to freely exercise one’s religion and the state’s compelling interest in mandating
two-person marriages. However, as will be discussed in Part II, the state also has a compelling interest in
preventing potential coercion and harm to women and children that is ever-present in religious-based
polygamy. For this reason, this Comment argues that the coercion-free structure of polyamory will have a
better chance at overturning polygamy laws in the future.
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that, even without the coercion frequently found in religious-based polygamy,
states still have compelling reasons to favor monogamy and disallow
polygamy. The strongest of these reasons is the strong link between economic
productivity and normative monogamy.
Part IV then takes up the task of determining how the law should analyze
polygamy that is free from coercion and religious interests. This Part explores
constitutional law sources to determine how a challenge to a state’s polygamy
ban might proceed. In addition, Part IV looks at states’ cohabitation laws that
seek to prohibit polygamous couples from living together despite marital
status. This Comment then concludes by suggesting that proponents of
legalized polygamy would be best served pursuing their objectives in the
legislative arena, rather than the judicial arena. Even then, normative
monogamy’s influence on productivity and societal progress cannot be ignored
as a compelling interest in maintaining the relationship structure.
I. POLYAMORY DELINEATED FROM POLYGYNY
Before undertaking an analysis of the legal differences between the various
forms of polygamy, it is necessary to actually define those forms. Given the
shifting interests the government may have in banning a certain type of plural
marriage, understanding the construction of certain arrangements becomes an
essential prerequisite to our study. Moreover, the academic study of plural
marriage is quite new, and therefore different scholars have used different
words to describe plural arrangements. Thus, this Part seeks to clarify the
terms used in the later Parts of this Comment.
“Polygamy” is the broad word that encompasses all arrangements of
marriage between more than two persons at the same time.21 Historically,
jurists have lumped most instances of plural marriage into the category of
“polygamy” and treated them essentially the same under the law. “Polygyny”
is the paradigmatic construction of polygamy in Western culture, describing
the arrangement of a man having two or more wives.22 Polygyny is
exponentially more common than other forms of polygamy and has been
rationalized by some as based on gender differences in the procreation
21

JOHN WITTE, JR., THE WESTERN CASE FOR MONOGAMY OVER POLYGAMY 26–27 (2015).
Id. at 28 (explaining the etymology of polygyny as coming “from the Greek poly for many and gyne
for wife or woman”). Subsets of polygyny are bigamy, which means marriage to two persons; trigamy,
meaning marriage to three persons; etc. Id. “Polygyny” is to be compared with “polyandry,” which is the
historically rare instance of a woman having two or more husbands. Id. at 26–28.
22
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process.23 Regardless of rationale, history shows that polygyny, a man taking
multiple wives, is the most common form of polygamy.24
“Polyamory,” on the other hand, describes all manner of plural spousal and
sexual arrangements.25 The way its advocates use the term today, “polyamory”
means the practice “of having more than one sexual [or, for some, romantic]
loving relationships at the same time, with the full knowledge and consent of
all partners involved.”26 Terisa, Matt, Vera, Larry, and Scott’s relationship, as
described in the Introduction, is an example of the modern polyamorous
relationship. Polyamorous relationships are between three or more knowing
and consenting persons, with the full group participating in romantic relations
together, or just a subset of the group engaging in romantic relations.27
The practice of polygyny has been criticized for centuries and for a myriad
of reasons. Despite Thomas Aquinas’s acknowledgement of the natural place
of polygyny, he argued against its practice because of its harmful effects on
women and children.28 “‘This is not marriage, but servitude,’ said Aquinas.”29
It betrayed the fidelity and mutuality of marriage and altered the fundamental
bond between children and parents.30 Later scholars added to the list of
polygyny critiques, including biblical,31 equality,32 and feminist33 arguments
for monogamy. The essential thread in polygyny’s historical criticism has been
its unjust and unequal result of treating women as something less than men.
When polygyny becomes the dominant model of marriage in a society,
23 See id. at 192. Thomas Aquinas believed that, because men bond with children only if they are certain
of their paternity, polygyny but not polyandry was a natural form of procreation. Id. at 170–76.
24 See Sarah L. Eichenberger, Note, When for Better is for Worse: Immigration Law’s Gendered Impact
on Foreign Polygamous Marriage, 61 DUKE L.J. 1067 (2012) (discussing the various constituencies of
polygamy). Indeed, most of the religious-based polygamy occurs in the polygyny form. “An estimated 5.8
percent of Hindu marriages are polygamous, and an estimated 5.7 percent of Muslim marriages are
polygamous.” Id. at 1069 n.12.
25 WITTE, supra note 21, at 27.
26 Ann E. Tweedy, Polyamory as a Sexual Orientation, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1461, 1479 (2011) (alteration
in original) (quoting Hadar Aviram, Make Love, Not Law: Perceptions of the Marriage Equality Struggle
Among Polyamorous Activists, 7 J. BISEXUALITY 261, 264 (2008)).
27 Id.
28 WITTE, supra note 21, at 170–71.
29 Id. at 173.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 255. Calvinist jurist Theodore Beza declared polygamy to violate God’s commandments against
adultery, theft, false testimony, and coveting at once. Id.
32 Id. at 455. English philosopher John Locke said that polygyny violated the natural-born equality of
men and women. Id.
33 Id. at 371. Eighteenth-century women’s rights advocate Mary Wollstonecraft said that polygyny forced
women to compete with other women, especially younger women, for the love of their husbands. Id.
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undesirable results occur that harm women and children. This is especially
concerning when women have no alternative choice in their marital
arrangements, a concern that continues with polygyny in America today.34
Polyamory, on the other hand, is largely seen to be free of the traditional
concerns of polygyny because of its participants’ choice to engage in the
practice for reasons other than religion or culture.35 Polyamory is very much
the modern descendent of the 1960s and 1970s Free Love movement, which
opposed marriage as a form of social and financial bondage.36 This movement
declared that marriage was a natural organization that should be outside the
scope of legal regulation, advocating instead for a new structure to accomplish
both love and propagation of the human race.37 Thus, the Free Love movement
sought to break from government’s mandate of monogamous marriage because
of concerns for both equality and love.
Modern-day polyamory is justified by the same basic thinking. One
advocate claims that polyamory governs itself by five main principles:
“self-knowledge, radical honesty, consent, self-possession, and privileging
love and sex over other emotions and activities such as jealousy.”38 Just as the
leaders of the Free Love movement viewed marriage as producing unequal

34

See infra Part II for a discussion of polygyny’s practice and regulation in the United States.
Compare Libby Copeland, Is Polygamy Really So Awful?, SLATE (Jan. 30, 2012, 5:18 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2012/01/the_problem_with_polygamy.html (disapproving of
polygyny as a societal tool of inequality), with Libby Copeland, Making Love and Trouble: The Surprisingly
Women-Friendly Roots of Modern Polyamory, SLATE (Mar. 12, 2012, 12:51 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2012/03/polyamory_and_its_surprisingly_woman_friendly_r
oots_.html (approving of polyamory as a tool of feminist empowerment). The logic behind this Comment’s
assumption, that religious- and cultural-based polygyny have elevated risks of coercion, is based on the fluid
notion of marital choice. Polygynous religions and cultures do not provide women with a choice between
polygyny and monogamy. Instead, women refusing to participate in polygyny often have no monogamous
option without leaving their religion or culture. These pressures subtly coerce women into accepting polygyny
and the potential human rights abuses that accompany polygyny because these women value their religion or
culture more than monogamy. These pressures are not felt by women engaging in polyamory, and thus this
Comment considers polyamory to be less coercive than polygyny.
36 See generally Alexandra Murray, Note, Marriage—The Peculiar Institution: An Exploration of
Marriage and the Women’s Rights Movement in the 19th Century, 16 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 137, 151–56
(2007) (describing the ideas of the Free Lovers in the nineteenth century).
37 Id. at 153–56. Victoria Woodhull, one of the leaders of the Free Love movement, declared that
marriage would be superseded “in the near future, by some kind of socialistic arrangement” because marriage
was the equivalent of slavery Id. at 153–54. Woodhull also believed that child rearing should be the
responsibility of the state instead of women. Id. at 154.
38 Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence,
29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 283 (2004).
35
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rights for women in the mode of slavery,39 polyamorists promote their
relationships’ endorsement of values like consent and self-determination. In a
way, polyamory is the result that Free Love movement leaders would have
constructed in the nineteenth century as a model of equality and love.
There has been far less written about polyamorous relationships for two
reasons. First, there simply are not the inherent human rights concerns for
women that are present in polygyny.40 Modern practitioners of polyamory
choose that relationship because of their desire for its tenets. They choose
polyamory for their love of multiple persons, not to meet the expectations of
society or the rules of a deity. Therefore, there is less concern for the rights of
these polyamory choosers, and thus their situation is written about less in
academic literature and popular media.
Second, practitioners of polyamory have yet to push for extensive legal
rights. In the vein of the Free Love movement, polyamorists are weary of the
necessity of marriage as an institution. Those who are married have a single
spouse, and the couple participates either individually or collectively with
others in a romantic relationship, with full knowledge and consent, but they do
not marry the other participants in the relationship, at least not in a legally
recognized way.41 Thus, so long as participants in polyamorous relationships
are not petitioning the state for recognition of their relationship as a marriage,
and the state is not pursuing criminal actions against polyamorous participants,
then polyamory is in a sort of legal holding pattern, just waiting for its chance
to land.42
But polyamory could see its challenge in court in the coming years,43 and it
is easy to imagine the potential scenarios. Taking the polyamorous relationship
from the Introduction as an example, there are several reasons one or more
39 Murray, supra note 36, at 153–54 (quoting free-love leader Victoria Woodhull as comparing marriage
to slavery and predicting the downfall of marriage in the same way that “thinkers” predicted the downfall of
slavery during the civil war).
40 See supra note 35.
41 Cf. Angi Becker Stevens, My Two Husbands, SALON (Aug. 4, 2013, 8:00 PM EDT),
http://www.salon.com/2013/08/05/my_two_husbands/ (describing the author’s polyamorous relationship with
her husband of seventeen years and her boyfriend of two years and noting that the author plans a non-legal
wedding ceremony with her boyfriend in the future).
42 But see infra Part IV.C (discussing cohabitation laws).
43 In a Canadian challenge to polygamy laws, many motions came not from polygyny groups, but from
polyamorous groups. Andrew Brown, Is Monogamy the Root of all Equality?, GUARDIAN (July 26, 2010, 7.00
EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/andrewbrown/2010/jul/26/religion-polygamy-monogamypsychology-crime.
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members may sue for recognition of rights from the state. First, what if one of
the five members died without a will? Would Washington’s intestate
succession laws recognize one of the deceased’s partners? Or would the
deceased’s property go to some relative? In the former scenario, a
non-inheriting partner may decide to sue for recognition of beneficiary rights.
In the latter scenario, any or all of the partners may sue for recognition of
beneficiary rights. Either would result in the state needing to decide whether
the polyamorous partner qualified as an eligible relationship for beneficiary
rights. Second, if Vera dies, who gets custody of Vera’s son? Perhaps one of
the men in the relationship is the son’s biological father, but that father would
still need to take legal action to obtain custody. Third, what if none of the men
are the son’s biological father? Would one of the people in the relationship be
the best custodian of the son in the eyes of the court? Fourth, what if a
child-services agency decides that the polyamorous home is not a suitable
venue for raising a child? Surely, then, the polyamorous participants would sue
to regain custody of their son. More and more examples exist, such as
employment benefits and health insurance benefits, as well as the possibility of
the state pursuing criminal sanctions under anti-polygamy laws. The stage is
therefore set for a legal challenge to the state’s right to regulate the numerosity
aspect of marriage for polyamorous relationships.
II. RELIGIOUS-BASED POLYGYNY IN THE UNITED STATES
The state’s first inclination, upon legal challenge by a polyamorous group
seeking legal recognition, may be to argue the case as though polyamory is
indistinguishable from traditional polygyny. This would be a mistake, for the
reasons discussed below. This Part explains why polyamory and polygyny
require two different analyses by the courts. To arrive at this understanding,
this Part begins in section A by examining Mormon challenges to polygamy
laws, which have been the emblematic challenges to polygamy in the United
States. Section B then considers the more recent trend of practicing
polygamists immigrating to the United States and maintaining their polygamy.
Section C briefly touches on the legal issues that these types of polygyny raise,
primarily examining the state’s human rights concerns in banning polygyny.
Section C then espouses this Comment’s opinion that human rights concerns
should trump any Free Exercise Clause concerns and that the state should
continue to prevent cultural- and religious-based polygyny in furtherance of
concerns for women and children. This point dovetails with the conclusion that
polygamy laws would face a very different challenge, with potentially different
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results, from coercion-free polyamory marriage, which will be discussed in
Parts III and IV.
A. Historical Context: Mormon Polygyny
As briefly discussed in the Introduction, the Mormon Church’s former
practice of polygyny as a dogmatic church doctrine underscores polygamy law
in the United States. The United States’ treatment and opinion of Mormons,
both collectively and individually, were and are a driving force behind the
banishment of plural marriage across the country and should thus be discussed
as part of the greater narrative on the future of plural marriage.
Joseph Smith, the man who started the Mormon Church, taught that
mankind could achieve godhood through their posterity on earth and that
polygyny was a central part of the pursuit of godhood.44 Men who rejected
polygyny, by contrast, were forfeiting godhood and allowing damnation.45
Mormons initially practiced polygyny in secret, until Brigham Young adopted
polygyny as part of the Church’s scriptural canon in 1852.46 Following the
Mormon Church’s public acknowledgement of its stance on polygyny,
significant persecution occurred.47 In 1856, the newly formed Republican Party
ran on a platform of eradicating the “twin relics of barbarism”: polygamy and
slavery.48 In the following decades, Congress passed a series of bills targeted at
ending the Mormon practice of polygyny.49
It is against this backdrop that the United States Supreme Court decided
Reynolds v. United States and Murphy v. Ramsey, which were briefly discussed
in the Introduction to this Comment. In Reynolds, Brigham Young’s personal
secretary, George Reynolds, agreed to challenge the Morrill Anti-Bigamy
Act.50 In the challenge, Reynolds testified that he engaged in plural marriage
because it was the “Law of the Lord,” an affirmative obligation to please
God.51 Nevertheless, Reynolds was twice convicted,52 and the Supreme Court

44

WITTE, supra note 21, at 430; Harmer-Dionne, supra note 16, at 1320.
Harmer-Dionne, supra note 16, at 1320.
46 WITTE, supra note 21, at 430; Harmer-Dionne, supra note 16, at 1320–21.
47 WITTE, supra note 21, at 430–31; Harmer-Dionne, supra note 16, at 1322–23.
48 Harmer-Dionne, supra note 16, at 1322.
49 WITTE, supra note 21, at 430–31; Harmer-Dionne, supra note 16, at 1322–23.
50 Emily J. Duncan, Article, The Positive Effects of Legalized Polygamy: “Love Is a Many Splendored
Thing,” 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 315, 318 (2008); Harmer-Dionne, supra note 16, at 1325.
51 Harmer-Dionne, supra note 16, at 1325.
52 The initial conviction was overturned on jury irregularities. Id.
45
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affirmed Reynolds’s conviction for bigamy.53 The Supreme Court based its
decision on the dichotomy between religious beliefs and religious action, with
the Free Exercise Clause protecting the former but not the latter.54 Reynolds
had the right to believe in polygamy but not the right to act on that belief.55
The Court said it also could have affirmed Reynolds’s conviction because of
the West’s historical adverseness to polygamy and polygamy’s “deleterious
moral effects.”56
Following Reynolds, Congress enacted even tougher laws targeted at
Mormon polygyny.57 One of these was the Edmunds Act, which sought to keep
Mormon polygamists from voting.58 This Act was upheld in Murphy.59
In 1890, following several decades of legal battles and persecution, the
Mormon Church finally declared its intention to abandon polygyny60 and
expelled its remaining polygamists from its Church Council in 1906.61
What began as the practice of an outsider group in pre-statehood Utah
eventually became notorious enough to warrant the attention of the
government, which eventually quashed the Mormon practice of polygyny.62
But polygyny continued in the West through an even more remote outsider
group: Mormon Fundamentalists.63 Fundamentalists have adhered to Joseph
Smith’s teachings on polygyny in the face of polygamy laws and persecution,
and they have carried the somewhat-dim torch of polygyny over the last
century.64 There are an estimated 30,000 to 100,000 Fundamentalists living in
North America65 who attempt to quietly live their lives in devotion to God.
Quiet, at least until 2006, when polygamist leader Warren Jeffs was arrested in

53

Id.
Id. at 1301–02.
55 Id. at 1302.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 1326.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 1326 n.260.
60 WITTE, supra note 21, at 436–37; Harmer-Dionne, supra note 16, at 1331–33.
61 WITTE, supra note 21, at 436–47; Harmer-Dionne, supra note 16, at 1334–35; see also
Harmer-Dionne, supra note 16, at 1331–35 (describing the Mormon Church’s process over the next decades of
expelling polygamists from its membership).
62 Kirk Johnson, Leader of Polygamist Mormon Sect is Arrested in Nevada, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2006,
at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/30/us/30polygamy.html.
63 WITTE, supra note 21, at 437.
64 Johnson, supra note 62.
65 Jason D. Berkowitz, Comment, Beneath the Veil of Mormonism: Uncovering the Truth About
Polygamy in the United States and Canada, 38 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 615, 617 (2007).
54
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Arizona.66 Jeffs spent four months on the FBI’s most-wanted list and was
suspected of several rape offenses, committing sexual acts with minors, and
several fleeing-authorities offenses.67 Jeffs was eventually convicted of
sexually abusing two minors, one of whom he fathered a child with, and is
currently serving a life sentence.68 Jeffs’s capture and trial raised public
awareness of polygamy in the United States to a level not seen in the previous
100 years.69
This discussion of the Mormon Church’s history with polygyny is
important because it shapes the discussion of the merits of monogamy and
polygamy.70 The world’s history is littered with examples of outsiders being
treated poorly, for a variety of reasons that are beyond the scope of this
Comment. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that, to many Americans,
polygamy and Mormonism are insuperably connected. Therefore, when people
(or juries) hear about a polygamist, they think of the tales of Warren Jeffs and
odd people living in shut-off communities in the West.71 And the most
compelling concern inherent to these marital structures is the women and
children, who are likely not getting a fair shake at life. The public thinks the
women are there through something less than free will, and the children are
living in chaos.
Cases like State v. Green only further these stereotypes of modern-day
Fundamentalist Mormon polygamists.72 Green was decided by the Utah
Supreme Court in 2004 after the conviction of Tom Green for polygamy with
nine wives and first-degree felony rape for marrying and impregnating a wife
when she was thirteen years old.73 Green’s twenty-five children were destitute
and living largely on social welfare.74 Green’s appeal centered on his free
exercise religious rights, but the Utah Supreme Court found the polygamy

66

Johnson, supra note 62.
Id.
68 Warren Jeffs Hospitalized, Polygamist Sect Leader Moved to Galveston, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 17,
2014, 11:59 AM EDT), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/17/warren-jeffs-hospitalized_
n_4979316.html.
69 Johnson, supra note 62.
70 See David L. Chambers, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 61–74 (1997)
(finding that Mormons encountered majoritarian scrutiny even before they engaged in polygamy). It is entirely
possible that courts resisted Mormon polygamy because they were skeptical of Mormons in general.
71 See Johnson, supra note 62.
72 99 P.3d 820, 834 (Utah 2004).
73 Id. at 822, 830 n.14.
74 Id. at 822–23.
67
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statute to be neutral and generally applicable.75 Most importantly, however, the
court found that Utah had an “interest in protecting vulnerable individuals from
exploitation and abuse.”76 In addition, the court upheld the polygamy laws on
the basis of deterring other crimes, finding that polygamy coincides with
violence against women and children, and with incest, sexual assault, and
statutory battery.77 Cases like Green paint a picture of American polygamy in
bleak colors, full of victims and short on freedom and love.
Most people have the same reaction to polygyny: that it’s not “normal.”
Nearly all Americans grew up far removed from Mormon Fundamentalist
compounds and therefore were raised in cultures accepting of only
monogamy.78 Trying to imagine the experience of a child raised in a house
with one father, multiple wives of the father, and multiple half-siblings is
difficult for anyone with a monogamist background. This sympathy for the
children, along with some innate suspicion of the men propagating this
structure, leads to some rather harsh feelings about polygamy in general. The
result is a bleak view of polygamy by mainstream America, as shown by a
recent Gallup poll that only fourteen percent of Americans find polygamy to be
“morally acceptable.”79
These visceral feelings about Mormons practicing polygyny bleed over into
our feelings about polygamy in general. We cannot separate our feelings about
the possibly coerced women growing up with the expectation of joining a
polygamous commune from our feelings about the idea of multiple partners
loving each other. We cannot separate our feelings about children growing up
in a complex marital environment from the idea of valuing love above societal
expectations. We cannot separate our feelings about Warren Jeffs marrying and
impregnating teenagers across the country80 from the idea of coercion-less,
multi-partner relationship arrangements. The story of polygyny in America is

75

Id. at 825, 827.
Id. at 830.
77 Id.
78 See Rebecca Riffkin, New Record Highs in Moral Acceptability, GALLUP (May 30, 2014),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/170789/new-record-highs-moral-acceptability.aspx. Polygamy was rated as one of
the most unacceptable categories.
79 Id. This negative view of polygamy, however, may be changing. The popularity of television shows
such as Sister Wives and Big Love suggest that mainstream society is at least curious about polygamy. At the
very least, these shows humanize polygamists. This new attention has slightly shifted polling numbers on the
matter. While fourteen percent of respondents to the 2014 Gallup poll agreed with polygamy, that number has
increased in recent years, up from five percent in a 2006 Gallup poll. Id.
80 See text accompanying notes 66–69.
76
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therefore thoroughly intertwined with the story of coercion and Mormonism.81
Unraveling these threads will be complex, but necessary.
B. The State’s Compelling Human Rights Interests
Oddly enough, the rise of stories like Warren Jeffs’s and Tom Green’s has
given states the most compelling interest in prohibiting polygyny, making the
already-clear constitutionality of polygamy bans even stronger.82 It is without
question that a central function of government is to protect its citizens’ basic
human rights.83 These human rights include the right to enter into marriage
without coercion,84 the right to not be held in servitude,85 and the right to
general security.86 In fact, one could think of government’s greatest interest
being that which coincides with the interests of the public at large: the safety of
the public both collectively and individually. This is why the government’s
police power is so legally potent.
Yet the state’s interest in protecting its citizens’ human rights often
conflicts with free exercise rights under the Constitution. How, then, are these
competing concepts weighed? Today’s model of constitutional law is
dominated by the balancing of rights.87 Dean T. Alexander Aleinikoff, in his
well-respected 1987 Article Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing,
charted the “balancing” method of constitutional reasoning and its dominance
as a way to adjudicate constitutional issues.88 The most common dichotomy of
81 A more recent American polygyny story concerns immigration of practicing polygynists. Despite its
lack of attention relative to Mormon polygyny, there may be more immigrant polygynists than Mormon
polygynists in America today. Eichenberger, supra note 24, at 1068. The legal treatment of immigrant
polygyny deserves separate analysis from Mormon polygyny and is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a
thought-provoking synopsis of why Mormon polygyny receives significantly greater media and legal attention
than immigrant polygyny, see Martha M. Ertman, Race Treason: The Untold Story of America’s Ban on
Polygamy, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 287, 288 (2010) (tracing mainstream disdain of Mormon polygyny to
“race treason”).
82 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 943–44,
946, 981 (1987) (describing constitutional-interest balancing’s widespread growth in the middle decades of the
twentieth century); see also text accompanying notes 66–77.
83 See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401 (1958)
(discussing the general objectives of the criminal justice system); see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9
(1985) (explaining the “governmental interests in effective law enforcement”).
84 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), at art. 16
(Dec. 10, 1948).
85 Id. at art. 4.
86 Id. at art. 3.
87 Aleinikoff, supra note 82, at 943–44 (describing balancing’s widespread growth in the middle decades
of the twentieth century).
88 Id. at 948–52.
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interests to be balanced is between individual interests and governmental
interests,89 often contemplating First Amendment individual rights.90 The
government’s interests, which may or may not be grounded in the Constitution,
are typically couched in terms of administrative efficiency or public interests.91
Dean Aleinikoff ultimately disapproves of the Court’s use of balancing to
solve constitutional conflicts, but the Court appears committed to the
utilization of balancing.92 This commitment is evident in the Court’s history of
deciding polygamy cases.
The commitment dates back to Reynolds, in which the Supreme Court
balanced the polygamist’s religious interest in polygamy against the state’s
interest in regulating marriage and social life, though the Court never called
their analysis balancing.93 This balancing is shown by the Court’s first analysis
of the polygamist’s religious rights followed by the analysis of the state’s
interest in monogamy and then stating that permitting religious beliefs to trump
monogamy law “would be to make the professed doctrines of religious beliefs
superior to the law of the land, and in effect permit every citizen to become a
law unto himself.”94
This practice of constitutional balancing becomes clearer when considering
the totality of the government’s efforts to stifle Mormonism. The governmental
interests that became the subject of Supreme Court decisions involved
criminalizing polygamy,95 restricting polygamists’ ability to vote,96 and
requiring voters to swear that they were not engaging in polygamy.97
Regulating the family unit and voting are major state interests.98 But imagine a
law that prohibited Mormons from proselytizing. Under the Reynolds test,
proselytizing is not regulating ideas, but action—the vocalization of beliefs and
attempted conversion of others—and should therefore be subject to state
regulation.99 But it is doubtful that the Supreme Court would have seen the
requisite governmental interest in limiting the Mormons First Amendment

89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

Id. at 946, 981.
Id. at 947.
Id.
Id.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162–65 (1879).
Id. at 167.
Id.
Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 17 (1885).
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
See Murphy, 114 U.S. at 45.
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167.
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rights. Thus, the Court naturally balances the interests of individuals against
the interests of the government.
An even more compelling state interest exists in the arena of plural
marriage regulation that was not included in Reynolds. While the Court had yet
to develop a cohesive theory on human rights when Reynolds was decided in
1879,100 today’s governmental interest in protecting its citizens from harm is
significant. The government’s interest in protecting women and children whose
living conditions in polygynous relationships have been exposed, in popular
media and through criminal investigations, has greatly increased in a way that
is much more robust than the Court’s historical approach to assessing interests
in Reynolds.101 In that way, the government’s stance against coerced polygyny
is even stronger today than in the days of Reynolds.
The Supreme Court of Utah acknowledged these new interests in its 2004
case of State v. Green, which was discussed in section A of this Part.102 “Most
importantly, Utah’s bigamy statute serves the State’s interest in protecting
vulnerable individuals from exploitation and abuse.”103 The court noted that
“the closed nature of polygamous communities” makes it “challenging” to
uncover these abuses, which makes regulation of the communities even more
compelling.104
As the media pays more attention to the vulnerable women and children in
Mormon polygynous communities, the state’s interest in protecting its citizens
grows stronger. Media attention to this aspect of polygyny was scant until
personal-interest stories began in 1998 with the Kingstons in rural Utah.105 The
media swarmed to the Kingston story of a fifteen-year-old girl named Jane,
who was forced to marry her uncle and was beaten when she tried to escape the
marriage.106 Media attention ultimately reached a crescendo in 2006 with
Warren Jeffs’s arrest.107

100

Id.
See notes 66–77 and accompanying text.
102 99 P.3d 820 (Utah 2004); see also discussion at text accompanying supra notes 72–77.
103 99 P.3d at 830.
104 Id.
105 See Amos N. Guiora, Protecting the Unprotected: Religious Extremism and Child Endangerment,
12 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 391, 403 (2010).
106 Id.
107 See discussion in text accompanying notes 66–69.
101
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These vulnerability concerns were not yet recognized thirty years ago,
when the Tenth Circuit upheld Utah’s bigamy laws in Potter v. Murray City.108
There, the court rooted Utah’s interest in preventing plural marriage in general
morality concerns109 and administrative concerns110 but did not mention
vulnerable women or children. The then-unrealized conditions of women and
children in these communities were not even necessary for the court to find
rational relationship to a governmental interest, but today, the state’s interest in
protecting its citizens from harm would meet even the highest burden.
The knowledge that some polygynous communities coerce their women
into marrying and committing incest makes the constitutional argument for
regulation of religious-based polygyny entirely stronger than when Potter was
decided by the district court thirty years ago.111 Even if the meaning of the Free
Exercise Clause has expanded during these last decades, it could not have
expanded more than our knowledge of the harms suffered by the vulnerable
women and children living in polygyny.112
Many advocates for rights to polygamy under the Free Exercise Clause
ignore human rights concerns in their entirety. Dean Keith E. Sealing of
Widener School of Law, for example, wrote a 2001 Article in favor of
polygamists’ constitutional right to plural marriage in which he declared that
states have “no compelling government interest in prohibiting polygamy.”113
But in his analysis seeking to reject various potential interests, Sealing skips
over vulnerability concerns, as though none exist.114 Sealing contents himself
108

760 F.2d 1065 (10th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1069 (noting that the “state has an undeniable interest in insuring that its rules of domestic
relations reflect widely held values of its people” (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 399 (1978)
(Powell, J., concurring in the judgment)).
110 Id. at 1070 (“[Utah’s] vast and convoluted network of other laws clearly establish[es] its compelling
state interest in . . . monogamy as opposed to plural marriage.” (quoting Potter v. Murray City, 585 F. Supp.
1126, 1138 (D. Utah 1984))).
111 See id. at 1065.
112 See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251
(2010) (describing a vulnerability theory within the context of American equality concepts); see also Rose
McDermott, Op-Ed., Polygamy: More Common Than You Think, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 2011, at A13, available
at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703806304576234551596322690 (“According to the
information I have helped to collect in the Womanstats database, women in polygynous communities get
married younger, have more children, have higher rates of HIV infection than men, sustain more domestic
violence, succumb to more female genital mutilation and sex trafficking, and are more likely to die in
childbirth. Their life expectancy is also shorter than that of their monogamous sisters. In addition, their
children, both boys and girls, are less likely to receive both primary and secondary education.”).
113 Sealing, supra note 14, at 695.
114 See id. at 754–57.
109
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with rejecting state administrative interests, such as property interests and
workers’ compensation benefits for plural spouses, as the only possible
interests a state may have in rejecting plural marriage.115 But, as the world saw
a few years before Sealing’s Article, a fifteen-year-old girl was forced to
become her uncle’s fifteenth wife and then beaten when she tried to escape the
marriage.116 This episode and many other instances of abuse received extensive
media attention,117 yet were entirely ignored by Sealing.118
There must be limits to the free exercise of religion. The risk that women
and children are being subjected to real harm is a compelling interest that
should give the government sufficient grounds for continuing to reject
religion- and culture-based polygyny. There are enough instances of
polygyny-rooted violence to demonstrate some type of cause-and-effect
relationship.119 The government should respond to these continual reports of
harm and coercion by enacting even tougher laws to protect the victims
currently walled off from society. The compelling interest in protecting our
most vulnerable should hold up to even the most exacting judicial scrutiny.120
115

Id.
Guiora, supra note 105, at 403.
117 See, e.g., James Brooke, Utah Struggles with a Revival of Polygamy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1998, at
12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/23/world/utah-struggles-with-a-revival-of-polygamy.html
(describing Kingston abuse); Julie Cart, Incest Trial Sheds Light on Polygamy in Utah, L.A. TIMES, June 4,
1999, at 3, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1999/jun/04/news/mn-44037 (describing Kingston trial);
Duncan Campbell, Mormon Found Guilty of Sex with Niece, GUARDIAN (June 4, 1999, 21.08 EDT),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/jun/05/duncancampbell (describing Kingston trial); Bruce Frankel,
Lifting the Veil: Ex-Plural Wife Rowenna Erickson Attacks an Enduring Utah Institution: Polygamy, PEOPLE,
June 21, 1999, at 125, available at http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20128539,00.html
(describing Kingston and other instances of Mormon polygamy abuse of women and children). News of Tom
Green’s practice of polygamy, giving rise to the prosecution in State v. Green, discussed supra at notes 72–77,
102–04, had also received significant media attention as Green had given extensive public interviews about his
practice of polygyny. Sigman, supra note 16, at 181.
118 Professor Sealing is not alone in overlooking vulnerability and coercion issues on the path to
wholehearted endorsement of polygyny. See also Stephanie Forbes, Comment, “Why Just Have One?”: An
Evaluation of the Anti-Polygamy Laws Under the Establishment Clause, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1517, 1541–46
(2003) (commenting that women in polygynous families are better off because they “have more free time than
other women” and that children in polygynous families are happy because they “are never without a play
group,” while dismissing evidence of incest and coercion on the grounds that polygamists “do not advocate”
incest or coercion).
119 See infra Part III.B.
120 It could be argued, however, that polygamy laws are not narrowly tailored to addressing the state’s
coercion and vulnerability interests and thus should fail under strict scrutiny. After all, monogamy produces
situations in which a spouse can be harmed, yet the government still allows marriage. This would be a valid
argument but for the setting in which religious-based polygyny is practiced. Mormon Fundamentalist polygyny
is practiced in walled-off compounds, areas in which police presence is virtually nonexistent. For example,
Jane, the girl forced to marry her own uncle, had to walk seven miles to get to the nearest telephone to report
116
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But this is where our story of religious- and cultural-based polygyny ends
and where our story of Terisa, Matt, Vera, Larry, and Scott121 picks up. This
Part has shown that the government’s best argument against polygyny is that
polygyny endangers women and children, but this argument does not apply to
people like Terisa and Vera, who have entered these relationships voluntarily
and knowingly and can leave them without fear of violence. Other arguments
for the government’s interests in regulating marriage, like Dean Sealing’s
convincing contention that governments would be able to handle the
administrative side of polygamy,122 may also be suspect when applied to a
coercion- and violence-free polygamous group. Does the government have an
interest in prohibiting polyamorous marriage? Is there something about
monogamy that merits its continued monopoly in our society?
III. THE STATE’S COMPELLING INTEREST IN BANNING POLYAMORY
If the state has an interest in banning polyamory, then there must be
something good about normative monogamy that we wish to encourage.
Alternatively, if there is no rational basis for maintaining monogamy, then
laws banning polyamory cannot withstand judicial scrutiny. In this sense,
monogamy and polyamory must be analyzed together. While some may claim
that legalizing polyamory would have no impact on monogamy, this Comment
argues otherwise. True, monogamous couples would not be forced to engage in
polyamory, but the potential harms of polyamory discussed in this section do
not require unanimous participation. Rather, it is the abandonment of
normative monogamy as a society-wide practice that would bring about
significant harms to social progress. Thus, the argument against polyamory is
the argument for normative monogamy.
An underlying assumption is that a shift in both the law and social norms of
marriage would alter human behavior. A societal shift toward polyamory
would therefore mean a shift away from normative monogamy. In theory, as
polyamory gains acceptance in the West, more people would be tempted to
practice it. This means that monogamy would have to decrease on an aggregate

her beatings to the police. Guiora, supra note 105, at 403. A narrowly tailored law seeking to protect women
and children by making beatings and forced marriage illegal would not be adequate, for the simple fact that
these are already laws, and are not protecting women and children in polygynous homes. The high potential for
violence in religious-based polygyny leaves the state with no alternative that would effectively meet the state’s
interest in protecting these women and children.
121 See supra Introduction.
122 Sealing, supra note 14, at 754–57.
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level. Therefore, adoption of polyamory would impact our society in a deep
and meaningful way, a way that should be fully contemplated before we
change the laws of marriage.
If there is anything to be learned from Reynolds, it is that Western cultures
feel very strongly that monogamy should be the basis for society’s families.
While the fact that the nation’s majority felt strongly about something may
have passed for a compelling state interest in the nineteenth century, today’s
courts feel differently. The majority’s collective moral compass can no longer
trump the individual rights of those pursuing choices contrary to those
morals.123
The origin of the West’s preference for monogamy continues to confound
social scientists. In August 2013, a team of social scientists released a report
finding that monogamy occurs because of males’ desire to protect their
offspring from other males.124 That same week, however, a team of zoologists
from Cambridge University released a report in direct conflict with the
infanticide theory, finding no correlation between infanticide and
monogamy.125 The Cambridge zoologists instead found that monogamy
develops where females live in low-density environments, out of a need for
resource defense.126 The direct conflict between these two studies only
highlights the vast and unproven nature of monogamy’s development.127
If we do not understand why our society developed into a monogamous
marital structure, how can we possibly have an interest in maintaining
monogamy? Doesn’t this prove a de facto lack of rationale for laws enforcing
monogamy? Despite the lack of theoretical basis for the origins of monogamy,
social science has made progress in understanding monogamy’s role in today’s
society. Social science in this area has developed significantly since the days of
123 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down laws criminalizing sodomy as
violating the challengers’ liberty interests as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Michael J.
Perry, Why Excluding Same-Sex Couples from Civil Marriage Violates the Constitutional Law of the United
States, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1887, 1907 (2014) (concluding that lawmakers lack the constitutional ability to
legislate on the basis of same-sex marriage’s perceived immorality).
124 See Christopher Opie et al., Male Infanticide Leads to Social Monogamy in Primates, 110 PNAS
13328 (2013).
125 See D. Lukas & T.H. Clutton-Brock, The Evolution of Social Monogamy in Mammals, 341 SCIENCE
526, 527 (2013).
126 Id. at 528 & fig.2.
127 See Belinda Luscombe, What Drove Man to Monogamy: It Wasn’t Love, TIME (July 30, 2013),
http://healthland.time.com/2013/07/30/the-reason-for-monogamy-researchers-disagree/ (showing the conflict
between the Opie and Lukas studies).
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Reynolds, such that traditional thinking on monogamy might not pass
constitutional muster in today’s courts. Nevertheless, new theories on the
foundational basis of marriage institutions still support the state’s interest in
maintaining monogamy as the basis of marriage law. This interest—an
economic interest—will be discussed after reviewing some other potential state
interests.
A. The Weak Interest: Existence of Laws Premised upon Monogamy
In Potter, the Tenth Circuit found that Utah had a state interest in banning
polygamy because of the state’s “vast and convoluted network of other
laws . . . based exclusively upon the practice of monogamy as opposed to
plural marriage.”128 Then, in a footnote, the Tenth Circuit listed the other laws
that would be changed should monogamy be abandoned, such as intestacy laws
and a law encouraging premarital counseling.129 Thus, Utah’s adoption of
monogamy as the marital base is a form of self-authenticating law, according
to the Tenth Circuit.130
The absurdity of this interest hardly deserves explanation. State laws
inherently combine to create a cohesive governance system. The existence of
one law informs the legislature’s creation of others. Yet the constitutionality of
a law cannot possibly be based on the legislature’s reliance on the law in
creating other laws. If it could, legislatures could trump all individual rights by
merely relying on an otherwise-unconstitutional law in setting up a “vast and
convoluted network of other laws.” Segregation was also integrated into
networks of other laws, yet the presence of those other laws did not trump
equal rights interests. Surely marriage laws are also capable of adapting to
change.
B. The Unknown Interest: Polygamy’s Link to Crime
In Part II.B, this Comment found that the state’s compelling interest in
protecting vulnerable women and children in polygnist communities exceeded
individual free exercise rights. Courts considering the issue since this problem
was exposed in the 1990s have concurred, finding protection of the vulnerable
to be the “most important[]” state interest, according to the Utah Supreme
128 Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 1985) (quoting Potter v. Murray City, 585 F.
Supp. 1126, 1138 (D. Utah 1984)).
129 Id. at 1070 n.8.
130 See id. at 1070.
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Court in Green.131 The Green court found that “[t]he practice of polygamy . . .
often coincides with crimes . . . [such as] incest, sexual assault, statutory rape,
and failure to pay child support.”132 But Green couched this interest in the state
police force’s “challenging” task of policing closed polygamous
communities.133 This leads to the question of whether open, coercion-free
polyamorous relationships also lead to crime.
A recent study shows that institutionalized monogamy reduces both crime
and social problems and that polygamy does indeed lead to greater crime
across society.134 In that study, a team led by Joseph Henrich of the University
of British Columbia found that cultures permitting polygamy see intra-sexual
competition, which leads to greater levels of crime, violence, poverty, and
gender inequality.135 Polygyny results in large numbers of unmarried men, and
those men are compelled to engage in crime for resources and women.136
Institutional monogamy, on the other hand, provides a more egalitarian
distribution of women, thus reducing intra-sexual competition. In turn, males
in monogamous societies are less likely to engage in crime.137
This is important research because courts currently concern themselves
only with abuse within polygyny communities. Professor Henrich’s team,
however, has found that instances of polygamy actually increase crime rates
for those who are not even practicing polygamy, namely men left without a
spouse.138 This logic could be extended to modern-day polygamy as a
legitimate interest for states maintaining monogamous marriage laws.
On the other hand, modern-day, coercion-free polyamory may not
implicate Henrich’s societal concerns. The root of polygamy’s crime
inducement is the large pool of unmarried men.139 Yet, as we saw in the
introductory example of Terisa, Matt, Vera, Larry, and Scott, today’s
polyamory does not necessarily create a gender-gap disparity. It is therefore
possible that the criminal concerns that accompany polygyny do not
necessarily implicate crime in gender-equal polyamory, since a theoretical
131

State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820, 830 (Utah 2004).
Id.
133 Id.
134 Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd & Peter J. Richerson, The Puzzle of Monogamous Marriage, 367 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 657 (2012).
135 Id. at 660–62.
136 Id. at 662.
137 Id. at 661.
138 Id. at 660–62.
139 See id. at 660.
132
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society with polyamorous groupings would not inherently create a pool of
unmarried men.
Then again, we do not know how wholesale governmental endorsement of
polyamory would impact the marital balance of the genders. Perhaps
polyamory would bring with it increased competition amongst men to secure
the most desirable mates, therefore making the acquisition of resources once
again important, which, as Henrich’s team saw, leads to criminal activity. Or
maybe polyamory would reduce men’s need to compete among each other
because the risk of being left spouseless in a polyamorous society would
decrease. More research is necessary to determine the exact root of Henrich’s
findings. Ultimately, an argument could be made that states have an interest in
maintaining monogamy until research determines the exact effects of
polyamory on crime.140
C. The Strong Interest: Nurturing Intra-Household Relationships
One of the state’s strongest interests in regulating marriage is the protection
of children.141 While polyamory does not feature the same types of concerns
for women that are present in polygyny, some of the concerns for children are
still present.142 While the women involved in polyamorous relationships
engage in polyamory of their own free will,143 the children do not enjoy such a
choice. The state, therefore, has the role of protecting the children.
Social science has shown that children may be at risk even in polyamorous
households.144 Homes with unrelated persons have a correlation with abuse,
violence, and homicide.145 In fact, children are more likely to be abused and
neglected in a home with an unrelated adult than children in a home with two
natural parents.146 Social scientists believe the reason for this violence against
140 See also Sigman, supra note 16, at 163 (“The social science scholarship on polygamy paints a complex
picture about the practice and therefore efforts to regulate it.”).
141 See State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820, 830 (Utah 2004); Ashby Jones, Why Do We Need the State’s
Permission to Get Married Anyway?, WALL ST. J.L. BLOG (Jan. 14, 2010, 6:01 PM ET),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/01/14/why-do-we-need-to-ask-the-state-for-permission-to-get-marriedanyway/.
142 See Henrich et al., supra note 134, at 665.
143 Julie Bindel, Rebranding Polyamory Does Women No Favours, GUARDIAN (Aug. 26, 2013, 9.26
EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/26/polyamory-no-favours-for-women.
144 See Henrich et al., supra note 134, at 664–65.
145 Id.
146 Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Discriminative Parental Solicitude: A Biological Perspective, 42 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 277, 282 (1980) (“[C]hildren living with one natural and one stepparent were 2.2 to 6.9
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unrelated children to stem from evolutionary biology, with some innate
compulsion for humans to protect their progeny.147 The risk, therefore, in
polyamorous households is that the increased number of unrelated adults may
lead to abuse and neglect of children.148
Unfortunately, children are at risk in a much greater way than abuse or
neglect. Stepmothers are more than twice as likely as genetic mothers to kill
their stepchildren.149 Even more concerning, children living with an unrelated
adult are substantially more likely to die “accidentally.”150 These staggering
studies show that children face a very real threat of death when unrelated
adults are present in their homes.151 Recent research from a team of University
of Ottawa psychologists also found that related parents are twice as likely to
identify potential hazards to children when compared to unrelated adults.152
Children, too, have a biological reaction to the presence of unrelated or
distantly related adults in the household.153 One study found that children in
homes with closely related relatives only had very low levels of cortisol, a
stress hormone.154 But the study showed that children with stepparents and half
siblings in their homes had the highest recorded levels of cortisol.155 This
means that children have a biological reaction that causes stress when living
with unrelated adults.156 Something deep within our conscience is wary of the
motives of unrelated adults living with children.157

times . . . as likely to be abused as children living with two natural parents, and 1.1 to 4.1 times as likely to be
neglected.” (citation omitted)).
147 Id. at 279.
148 Henrich et al., supra note 134, at 665.
149 Viviana A. Weekes-Shackelford & Todd K. Shackelford, Methods of Filicide: Stepparents and
Genetic Parents Kill Differently, 19 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 75, 78 (2004) (finding that stepmothers have a
filicide rate of 20.6 children per million children, compared with 8.6 children per million children for genetic
mothers).
150 Henrich et al., supra note 134, at 665 (finding that children living with an unrelated adult “are between
15 and 77 times more likely to die ‘accidentally’”). The wide variance found in this study only goes to show
how little we know about this scarcely researched topic.
151 Id.
152 Emma L. Thompson et al., Reasoning and Relatedness, 36 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 38, 40 (2015).
153 Henrich et al., supra note 134, at 665.
154 Id. (citing Mark V. Flinn, Carol V. Ward & Robert J. Noone, Hormones and the Human Family, in
HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 552 (David M. Buss ed., 2005)).
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 See Children at Higher Risk in Nontraditional Homes, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 18, 2007, available at
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/21838575/ns/health-childrens_health/t/children-higher-risk-nontraditionalhomes/.
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This is not to say that all adults are incapable of properly caring for an
unrelated child. Clearly, if that were the case, then the government would have
a compelling reason to entirely forbid adoption and other laws that allow
unrelated adults to care for children. Rather, these statistics show that society
should appreciate the positive benefits of monogamy on children’s lives.158
Social science shows that our children will be safer in homes without unrelated
adults,159 so the government’s interest in protecting children therefore extends
to laws that give children the greatest possible chance to be raised in safe,
monogamous homes. To ignore these studies showing legitimate risks of
abuse, neglect, and homicide is to ignore children themselves in favor of our
desires to have relationships with multiple persons.160 Certainly a state’s
interest in protecting children allows for a state preference for limiting
marriage to two persons.161
Moreover, there is evidence from social science that polyamorous
households may not be as conflict-free as we would expect from the short tale
of Terisa, Matt, Vera, Larry, and Scott in the Introduction.162 A recent
anthropological look at polygamous societies found no evidence of
relationships between co-spouses that could be categorized as “harmonious.”163
Instead, the study found significant disputes between the co-spouses in
polygamous homes.164 This cuts against the notion that polyamorous
relationships create an ideal marital form by suggesting that innate senses of
jealousy are not so easily removed from the relationship paradigm.165 This risk
of opening the door to increased intra-household conflict becomes even more
concerning when the possibility of multiple children from different subsets of
parents enters the fray, leaving children exposed as the victims as adults settle
their disputes.166 With all of this potential for upheaval in the household, states
surely have an interest in maintaining the relatively safe societal construct of
the monogamous household.167
158

See Henrich et al., supra note 134, at 665.
Id.
160 Id.
161 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944) (noting the state’s authority to protect the
welfare of children).
162 See William Jankowiak, Monika Sudakov & Benjamin C. Wilreker, Co-Wife Conflict and
Co-operation, 44 ETHNOLOGY 81, 91 tbl.1 (2005).
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 See id.
166 See Henrich et al., supra note 134, at 665.
167 Id.
159
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D. The Strongest Interest: Normative Monogamy as an Economic Stimulant
The strongest argument for maintaining monogamy-based restrictions on
marriage is one that has yet to be considered by any court considering a
challenge to polygamy laws: monogamy’s impact on overall citizen
productivity.168 The government’s interest in advancing the collective
prosperity of its citizenry has long been acknowledged.169 While the state’s
exact interest in advancing commercial interests of its populace has been
debated since the founding of the nation,170 it is now clear that the government
can act to further economic goals.171 In some respects, this commercial interest
is a necessary competitive process, wherein governments compete against
other governments to achieve prosperity and growth.172 This competition has
been evident at the local and state levels, in economic development pursuits,173
and the international level, with cold war economic maneuvers and trade
embargos.174 In other respects, the government’s commercial interest stems
from naturally occurring market failures, such as an interest in correcting
externalities or providing public goods.175 Regardless of the basis, the
government’s interest in enabling and promoting commerce is strong.176
Social science research has found that polygamy results in harmful
economic consequences in the form of diminished per capita gross domestic

168

Id. at 658.
See Richard W. Miller, The Interest of the Governed and the Interests of Humanity: The Moral
Importance of Borders, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1785, 1791 (2010) (“[S]overeign citizenries typically devote energy
and attention, take risks, and make sacrifices in a collective project of advancing prosperity and justice in their
territory.”).
170 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 11 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing for uniform regulations over commerce to
increase the nation’s ability to trade with European countries).
171 See About Commerce: Mission Statement, U.S. DEP’T COM., http://www.commerce.gov/page/aboutcommerce#mission (last updated Apr. 7, 2015, 11:59 AM) (describing its mission to make businesses more
innovative and competitive) [hereinafter Mission Statement].
172 N. Gregory Mankiw, Competition is Healthy for Governments, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2012, at
BU5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/15/business/competition-is-good-for-governments-tooeconomic-view.html.
173 See generally Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on
State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377 (1996) (describing the “intense interstate
competition for economic activity” for attracting business relocations).
174 Russia vs. USA: Economic Cold War, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFF. (Sept. 17, 2012),
http://www.coha.org/russia-vs-usa-economic-cold-war/.
175 See generally HENRY N. BUTLER, CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL & JOANNA SHEPHERD, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS 125–29 (3d ed. 2014) (providing an overview of the ways government responds to
market failures).
176 Mission Statement, supra note 171.
169
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product.177 Economist Michèle Tertilt, formerly of Stanford University and
now at the University of Mannheim, has found that societies that impose
monogamy on its citizens enjoy a 170% increase in per capita output.178
According to Professor Tertilt, this significant surge in citizen productivity is
because monogamy causes men to save their financial resources more than
men practicing polygamy.179 In monogamous societies, men cannot invest in
obtaining additional wives, so instead they have fewer children and use their
resources in more productive ways.180
Professor Joseph Henrich and his team have built on these findings to show
that normative monogamy results in men’s increased focus on child rearing.181
While men in polygamous societies invest their resources in obtaining more
long-term mates, men in monogamous societies have been found to channel
efforts into their families, which Professor Henrich notes to be more “reliable
economic productivity.”182 This investment in childrearing not only improves
“offspring quality”183 but also has been found to improve child health
outcomes.184
Evidence from biological science confirms the status of the male mind in
prioritizing between mate-seeking and childrearing activities.185 A team of
Harvard University anthropologists has found that men experience a drop in
testosterone levels when they get married and again when they have a child.186
High levels of testosterone have been found to lead to risky behavior in men,
stemming from pressure to acquire resources in an attempt to attract mates.187
Yet contrary to the typical testosterone drop following marriage and child birth
in monogamous relationships, men in polygamous relationships do not
experience the same reaction.188 In fact, one study suggests that polygamous
177

See Michèle Tertilt, Polygyny, Fertility, and Savings, 113 J. POL. ECON. 1341, 1342 (2005).
Id. at 1343.
179 Id. at 1363.
180 Henrich et al., supra note 134, at 664.
181 Id. at 665–66.
182 Id. at 666.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 See Peter B. Gray et al., Marriage and Fatherhood Are Associated with Lower Testosterone in Males,
23 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 193, 199 (2002).
186 Id.
187 Coren L. Apicella et al., Testosterone and Financial Risk Preferences, 29 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV.
384, 387–88 (2008).
188 Peter B. Gray, Marriage, Parenting, and Testosterone Variation Among Kenyan Swahili Men,
122 AM. J. PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 279, 282 (2003).
178
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men actually experience even higher testosterone levels.189 This phenomenon
is likely because polygamous men are still involved in the active process of
mate-seeking and therefore participating in risky, testosterone-fueled
behavior.190 Thus, men in polygamous relationships are biologically dissuaded
from engaging in societally desirable childrearing and long-term financial
investment.
This is a substantial finding that should topple the theory upon which
polyamory is built. Despite being labeled as an externality-free marital
arrangement,191 polyamory may actually cause significant societal costs that
result in economic stagnation.192 Men that would otherwise turn their attention
and resources toward productive means would instead remain focused on
mate-seeking processes, engaging in risky—and sometimes criminal193—
behavior along the way. If Professor Tertilt’s research is accurate, then a broad
shift in the United States towards polyamory could result in a momentous drop
in per capita gross domestic product.194
The state’s interest in maintaining economic advantages should not be
taken lightly.195 From a development anthropological level, the social norms a
society adopts affect the very success of that society.196 In fact, Professor
Henrich has theorized that Europe’s adoption of normative monogamy may
have led to Europe’s relative developmental success because of monogamy’s
encouragement of productivity.197 The benefits of monogamy—including
investments in education, offspring, and business opportunities—may have
even contributed to the Industrial Revolution.198
If Professor Henrich is correct, then many innovations we enjoy today may
exist because of normative monogamy. Imagine a world where Henry Ford
focused his efforts on wooing women instead of automobiles or where Thomas
Edison invested in short-term projects rather than his many innovations. Would
the option of taking additional wives have changed their incentives? What
189

Id.
Apicella et al., supra note 187, at 387–88.
191 Bill Muehlenberg, Islam and Polygamy, CULTURE WATCH (May 10, 2009, 2:00 PM),
http://billmuehlenberg.com/2009/10/05/islam-and-polygamy/.
192 Tertilt, supra note 177, at 1342.
193 See supra Part III.B.
194 Tertilt, supra note 177, at 1342.
195 Mission Statement, supra note 171.
196 See Henrich et al., supra note 134, at 666.
197 Id.
198 Id.
190
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future innovations might not occur if our society shifts to endorse polyamory?
The social norms that have led to unprecedented progress as a society should
therefore be given enormous deference in the face of a constitutional
challenge.199
Yet courts considering challenges to polygamy laws have ignored this vital
role of monogamy.200 Moreover, legal scholars addressing the legality of the
state’s interest in regulating monogamy have essentially skipped over the
research from the other social sciences.201 Most concerning of all, the very
lawyers representing states in polygamy law challenges are not even arguing
for the benefits of normative monogamy discussed in this Part.202 This
analytical exclusion should cease, and courts should instead recognize the
economic benefits that normative monogamy has bestowed upon our nation.
IV. STANDARD AND TEST FOR STATE BANS OF POLYAMORY
Once the state’s interest in regulating polyamory is established, we still
must conduct a constitutional analysis to determine the appropriate legal test to
apply to those polygamy laws. The balancing analysis203 for polyamory
becomes lighter on both sides of the ledger, in comparison with the analysis of
religious-based polygyny. On the state-interest side, the most important interest
of protecting the vulnerable from abuse204 is no longer a valid concern because
of the lack of coercion. In polyamory, women join a nonmonogamous
relationship because they want to, not because their religion or culture coerces
them. And, on the individual-interest side, challengers to polygamy laws can
no longer cite the Free Exercise Clause in support. This changes the necessary
analysis completely. This Part will show that, because there is no longer an
argument of a constitutional right to enter into plural marriage, polygamy laws
199

Of course, findings that polyamory may lead to societal inefficiencies do not necessarily end the
constitutional analysis. Social science, after all, does not amount to indisputable proof. But the social science
findings discussed in this Part should suffice to withstand judicial scrutiny, which is discussed in Part IV.
Finding indisputable proof is not required of states under constitutional analysis. If it were, no law could be
upheld. Instead, the social science rationale discussed in this Part need only be credible to qualify as a state
interest.
200 See, e.g., Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885); State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820 (Utah 2004).
201 See Sealing, supra note 14, at 754–57.
202 See, e.g., Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment at 7–11, Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (2013) (No. 2:11-CV-00652), 2012 WL
10172971 [hereinafter Defendant’s Reply Memorandum] (limiting the state’s arguments to historical and
administrative reasons).
203 See supra Part II.B.
204 Green, 99 P.3d at 830.
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would likely need to pass only rational basis review under the Equal Protection
Clause, unless the challengers can implicate another constitutional right.
Section A begins by explaining why Reynolds should not, in any way, control a
polyamory challenge to polygamy laws. Section B then searches for the correct
constitutional analysis for polygamous restrictions on marriage. Section C
finally takes a brief look at cohabitation laws, as opposed to marriage laws, to
see if that analysis differs at all.
A. Why Reynolds Should Not Control Polyamory
The United States Supreme Court has yet to hear a nonreligious case
challenging a state’s polygamy laws. If, and when, it does, the Court will need
to find some guidance in case law to start their analysis. They may well be
tempted to rely on Reynolds,205 which is still good law and holds that
individuals do not have a right to plural marriage.206 This would seem to make
for a good starting point, but it is not. The bases on which the Waite Court
decided Reynolds would have little applicability to a coercion-free polyamory
challenge. This section walks through those bases in an effort to show that
Reynolds makes for a poor guidepost.
First and foremost, Reynolds was decided with a bias against Mormons,
which has been shown by historians.207 Professor David L. Chambers of the
University of Michigan Law School has written about Mormons’ persecution
from the “earliest years” of the church, even before they embraced
polygyny.208 The main reason for mainstream America’s resistance of
Mormons, according to Professor Chambers, was the perceived threat to
“Protestant hegemony.”209 Upon arriving in Utah, Mormons quickly gained
political control of the nearby governments, and Brigham Young rose to
territorial governor.210 The Protestant establishment grew to fear Mormons as a
group, and that fear adapted into hostility and violence.211 It was the Mormons’
practice of polygyny, however, that gave the mainstream majority the
205

Part II.

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). For discussion of Reynolds, see supra Introduction and

206 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 649–50 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he proposition that
polygamy can be criminalized . . . remains good law.”).
207 See, e.g., Ertman, supra note 81, at 288 (showing how government leaders during the days of Reynolds
thought of Mormons as “race traitors”).
208 Chambers, supra note 70, at 61–74.
209 Id. at 62.
210 Id. at 62–63.
211 Id. at 63.
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articulable reason to hate the Mormons, and it was polygyny that became the
focal point for fear and hostility towards Mormons.212 Reynolds, therefore,
must be viewed as a rejection of Mormonism as much as a rejection of
polygamy.213
Second, Chief Justice Waite decided Reynolds on the declaration that
polygamy is a historical abomination among civilized cultures.214 But our
understanding of polygamy’s history has developed since 1879, and the
historical-abomination argument is no longer a valid argument. Ignoring Chief
Justice Waite’s comment about polygyny’s suitability among African and
Asiatic people,215 the Court’s morality concerns would not apply to a
polyamorous challenge to polygamy laws. The Court is essentially saying that
monogamy is what we have always done.216 This is no longer thought to be a
compelling reason for making law. If it were, then most of the progress made
since 1879 would have been defeated at the Supreme Court level.217 State laws,
even at the lowest level of scrutiny, require some legitimate interest, and
Reynolds did not espouse any real interest in declaring polygamy to be an
abomination.218
The combination of these two flaws in Reynolds makes the case of little use
in modern Free Exercise Clause analysis but of no use in a nonreligious
challenge. If you remove the historical aversion to Mormonism and require the
state to proffer a legitimate state interest in its polygamy laws, then Reynolds
stands for an empty ipse dixit holding that the West has always been
monogamous.219 Consider a modern-day challenge from a polyamorous
212

Id.
Richard A. Vazquez, Note, The Practice of Polygamy: Legitimate Free Exercise of Religion or
Legitimate Public Menace? Revisiting Reynolds in Light of Modern Constitutional Jurisprudence, 5 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 225, 230 (2001) (“The tone of the Reynolds opinion reflected contemporaneous
prejudicial sentiment felt throughout the United States toward polygamy.”).
214 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879).
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 For example, in 1878, interracial marriage was vilified by the mainstream Protestant majority. See
Kinney v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 858 (1878). Five years after Reynolds, the Supreme Court
upheld Alabama’s anti-miscegenation statute in Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883). This precedent, of
course, did not keep the law from progressing over time, and the Supreme Court ultimately reversed Pace in
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
218 Vazquez, supra note 213, at 229 (“This section of [Reynolds] lacked substantive legal reasoning and
references to viable public policy justifications. Instead, it cast polygamy in such prejudicial light as to imbue
subsequent, suspect opinions with the appearance of reasoned support.”).
219 It is possible, however, that lower courts may still be required to follow Reynolds’s reasoning-free
holding when applied to nonreligious polygamy. In a recent same-sex marriage decision, the Sixth Circuit
213
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person. A free-minded person choosing non-monogamy for nonreligious
reasons is so far removed from Brigham Young’s personal secretary. The
polyamorist of today shares no motivations or interests with a Mormon, other
than desiring an outcome of plural marriage. Thus, a polyamory challenge to
monogamy deserves fresh analysis.
B. Potential Polyamory Challenges to Polygamy Laws
How should a polyamory challenge to polygamy laws go about its legal
analysis, if not relying on Mormon-based polygamy case law? Polygamy laws
restrict marriage, and therefore the correct model for analyzing a polyamory
challenge to polygamy laws is following the analysis of other challenges to
marriage restrictions. Following this line of precedent would give the court a
starting point for analysis. The problem here, however, is the current
uncertainty in the law based on divergent opinions on constitutional rights of
same-sex couples. Indeed, 2014 saw five different courts of appeals consider
constitutional challenges to restrictions on same-sex marriage,220 with the
Supreme Court granting certiorari in one of them (four challenges were
mounted on the Sixth Circuit opinion, and the Court granted the petitions and
consolidating the cases for hearing).221 Four of the five appellate cases granted
the same-sex couples the right to marry, but they did so on different
grounds.222 Thus, until the Supreme Court issues guidance on the correct

noted that Supreme Court holdings are binding, even if subsequent Supreme Court language appears to cast
doubt on the validity of the prior case:
Just two scenarios, then, permit us to ignore a Supreme Court decision, whatever its form:
when the Court has overruled the decision by name . . . or when the Court has overruled the
decision by outcome . . . . Any other approach returns us to a world in which the lower courts may
anticipatorily overrule all manner of Supreme Court decisions based on counting-to-five
predictions, perceived trajectories in the caselaw, or, worst of all, new appointments to the Court.
DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 401 (6th Cir. 2014). Thus, reversing Reynolds, or at least updating it with
modern-day reasoning, may require direct action from the Supreme Court. On the other hand, lower courts
could distinguish Reynolds from a polyamorous challenge by finding that Reynolds applied only to polygyny
and not polyamory.
220 See DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1040 (2015); Baskin v.
Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 2014); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 464 (9th Cir. 2014); Bishop v. Smith,
760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 368 (4th Cir. 2014).
221 See Bourke v. Beshear, 135 S. Ct. 1041 (2015) (mem.); DeBoer v. Snyder, 135 S. Ct. 1040 (2015)
(mem.); Tanco v. Haslam, 135 S. Ct. 1040 (2015) (mem.); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039, 1040 (2015)
(mem.).
222 DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 402 (“Four courts of appeals thus far have recognized a constitutional right to
same-sex marriage. They agree on one thing: the result. But they reach that outcome in many ways, often more
than one way in the same decision.”).
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analysis of the constitutionality of marriage restrictions later in this Term, the
analysis of a potential plural-marriage challenge is left questioned. This section
searches for the correct analysis by evaluating the challenge methods of past
marriage restrictions.
1. Fundamental Right
The starting point for our analysis of the constitutionality of bans on
coercion-free polyamory is whether the polyamorous have a fundamental right
to marry multiple persons. While the United States Supreme Court has, from
time to time, recognized a fundamental right to marry, the basis of this right is
under-theorized, and therefore it is difficult to extrapolate in gauging the
right’s applicability to various marriage restrictions.223 This lack of foundation
is likely the reason for the varied results among the courts of appeals in 2014 in
determining a fundamental right to same-sex marriage.224 Until the Supreme
Court clarifies the nature of the fundamental right to marriage, it is likely that
courts would only further the confusion over the right should a polyamorous
challenge to polygamy laws come forward.
Loving v. Virginia, the case that struck down Virginia’s anti-miscegenation
law, set the stage for the notion of a fundamental right to marry.225 While
basing the opinion primarily on Virginia’s unconstitutional racial
classifications,226 the Loving Court also inserted language that acknowledged
some right to marriage. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, said that
“[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal
rights” that was “fundamental to our very existence and survival.”227 Despite
Chief Justice Warren’s attempt to tie this signal of a fundamental right to
marry back to Virginia’s suspect racial classifications, he never explains the
root of the right.228

223 See Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
1375, 1386 (2010) (finding that the notion of a fundamental right to marry suffers from confusion because
“both the rationale for that right and its structure have remained unclear”).
224 Compare Bostic, 760 F.3d at 376 (“[W]e conclude that the fundamental right to marry encompasses
the right to same-sex marriage . . . .”), with DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 421 (finding no fundamental right to same-sex
marriage).
225 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
226 Id. at 11.
227 Id. at 12.
228 Professors Tebbe and Widiss have written that Loving’s language about the fundamental right to marry
is “probably best understood as a hybrid” between “evenhandedness and autonomy.” Tebbe & Widiss, supra
note 223, at 1388.

PORTER GALLEYSPROOFS

2128

5/19/2015 2:36 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:2093

A decade later, the Burger Court cited to Loving as granting an
equal-protection-based fundamental right to marriage in Zablocki v. Redhail, a
case that invalidated a state law requiring fathers who owed child support to
get a court order before marrying.229 In Zablocki, Justice Thurgood Marshall’s
majority opinion used Loving, along with some dicta from older cases on the
importance of marriage,230 to cement the notion that restrictions on marriage
require the court’s strict scrutiny.231 Interestingly, however, Justice Marshall
went on to limit the applicability of strict scrutiny in marriage cases to only
cases where a “statutory classification . . . interfere[s] directly and substantially
with the right to marry.”232 “By reaffirming the fundamental character of the
right to marry, we do not mean to suggest that every state regulation which
relates in any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be
subjected to strict scrutiny.”233 Instead, Justice Marshall declared that
“reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to
enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed.”234 Marshall’s
language in Zablocki appears to be calling for a balancing test between the
interests of the state and the marriage interests of the individual.235
The Rehnquist Court then weighed in on the nature of the right to marry in
Turner v. Safley, a case holding that prisoners did not need a superintendent’s
permission to marry.236 It appears that Justice O’Connor, writing for the
majority, applied the balancing test called for by Justice Marshall in Zablocki
by considering marriage’s fundamental nature in society and noted the policy
reasons for promoting marriage by scrutinizing restrictions on marriage.237
Turner, however, declined to determine whether this restriction on marriage
should be held to strict scrutiny because the relevant restriction could not
survive even rational basis scrutiny.238 The prisons’ security interests,

229

434 U.S. 374 (1978).
Id. at 384 (citing, in turn, Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923)).
231 Id. at 383.
232 Id. at 387.
233 Id. at 386.
234 Id.
235 See supra Part II.B for discussion of balancing tests. Of course, balancing tests do not come naturally
when the court applies either strict scrutiny or rational basis, but Justice Marshall did not believe in such rigid
application of scrutiny. See discussion infra Part IV.B.4.
236 482 U.S. 78, 99–100 (1987).
237 Id. at 95–96.
238 Id. at 97.
230
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according to Justice O’Connor, were not rational reasons to forbid prison
marriage, given the facts surrounding the policy.239
Thus, from this line of cases, we have the notion that marriage’s
fundamental importance in society is hefty enough to require good reasons for
its regulation, but the doctrine behind that fundamentalism is varied and
under-theorized, and the guidelines for a balancing test are unspecified.240 It
should not come as a surprise, then, that courts have had foundational
differences in the reaches of the state’s ability to regulate marriage.
Many courts have turned back to traditional fundamental-rights analysis in
the face of Loving’s, Zablocki’s, and Turner’s lack of clarity.241 The traditional
test, as set forth in Washington v. Glucksberg, is whether the right being
asserted is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history in tradition” or whether the
right is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”242 Courts applying this test
to same-sex marriage have rejected the applicability of the former test, since
same-sex marriage has no history or tradition in the United States, but the
second test has seen a different analysis.243 A polyamory test would likely see
the same analysis, given the lack of historical support. A polyamory test would
therefore likely force the courts to determine whether the regulation of the
number of participants in a marriage undermines our concepts of liberty.
Given this also-vague direction from the Supreme Court, it is no wonder
that courts have struggled even under this more-established test. In the context
of same-sex marriage challenges, the courts finding a fundamental right have
applied the test generally and determined that gender restrictions on marriage
come under the larger definition of marriage, a great liberty interest.244 Those
declining to find a fundamental right have taken a restricted view of the
fundamental right to marriage, instead focusing on access issues like the
challenges in Zablocki and Turner.245

239

Id.
Tebbe & Widiss, supra note 223, at 1390–91 (noting that Loving, Zablocki, and Turner “do not share a
consistent doctrinal basis”).
241 See, e.g., DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 411–12 (6th Cir. 2014) (finding no analytical support from
Loving, Zablocki, or Turner).
242 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting, in turn, Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977),
and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
243 See, e.g., DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 411.
244 See, e.g., Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 656 (7th Cir. 2014).
245 See, e.g., DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 411–13.
240
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A polyamory challenge would suffer from the same lack of guidance.
While clearly polygamy has no historical rights in the United States, the liberty
interests in expressing love and commitment provide a plausible argument for
expanding the concept of marriage. Yet the state interests described in Part III
provide the counterbalance called for in Zablocki and should withstand even
strict scrutiny. Much of this analysis depends on the future clarity of the
fundamental right to marry in the context of same-sex marriage. It should be
understood, however, that a potentially fundamental right to same-sex marriage
does not necessarily mandate a fundamental right to marry multiple partners.
The upcoming Supreme Court decision on same-sex marriage will be most
useful in clarifying the appropriate analysis for future cases concerning
polyamory, but it is doubtful that the Court will signal any type of broad right
to determine one’s own marriage form. Instead, the Court will most likely
grant same-sex rights as an equal right within our society’s normative
monogamy paradigm. The necessary analysis pertaining to polyamory requires
entirely different consideration. In that analysis, the economic interests of the
state in maintaining monogamy should ultimately retain the court’s deference,
even if the court finds polygamy laws to concern a fundamental right.246
2. Suspect Classifications
Under the Equal Protection Clause, attempts by legislators to single out
groups for unequal treatment receive heightened scrutiny by the courts.
Whether this two-tiered approach began with Loving v. Virginia247 or earlier,248
the traditional classifications that have enjoyed the court’s heightened scrutiny
are certain to include race, gender, alienage, and illegitimacy.249 Recently,
however, some courts have expanded the groups receiving heightened
246 One might ask of the limits to the state’s economic interests. Could the state pass a law prohibiting
video games under an economic-interest theory? The simple answer is yes. There is no fundamental right to
play video games. Thus, if the state has a rational basis for believing that banning video games will increase
productivity, then the video game ban should be upheld. The recourse for opponents of the video game ban
should be through political channels. Just because a video game ban would be a misguided policy does not
make it unconstitutional.
247 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
248 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81,
100 (1943). The disagreement on when equal protection’s two-tiered analysis began can be important given
the analysis that modern application requires. Compare Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern
Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 226–40 (1991) (claiming Loving to be the analysis’s origin), with
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the
Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2250–69 (2002) (tracing the two-tiered analysis back to
Hirabayashi and Korematsu).
249 Klarman, supra note 248, at 283.
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protection to include classifications based on sexual orientation.250 Typical
suspect-classification analysis applies any number of factors to determine
whether a group should be considered a protected class warranting heightened
review under equal protection analysis: whether the group has been historically
victimized by government discrimination; whether the group has a defining
trait, along with the relevancy of that trait; and whether the group is politically
powerless.251
While the polyamorous have virtually no history of positive discrimination
by government units,252 the polyamorous do fit the rest of the factors for
consideration as a suspect classification. The polyamorous have a clear and
defining trait, and that trait is the basis of their constitutional challenge to laws
restricting their marriage. The polyamorous might also be politically
powerless, though no known studies can corroborate the political prowess of
the nonmonogamous.
Previous identification as a suspect class has not stopped the courts from
applying heightened scrutiny if the legislature is clear in its motives. In U.S.
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, for example, there was evidence that
Congress wanted to keep “hippies” off of food stamps and tailored the law
specifically at hippies.253 Justice Brennan, writing for the U.S. Supreme Court,
declared that hippies could be a suspect classification and struck down the
law.254 This demonstrates courts’ willingness to strike down classifications
when improper purposes warp the legislative process.255
For the polyamorous, however, there are not likely to be any documented
instances of purposeful legislative discrimination targeted at those wishing to
marry multiple persons, which casts doubt on the likelihood of success as a
suspect classification. On the other hand, if clear discrimination against
Mormons can be shown to have warped the legislative process in creating
polygamy laws, then perhaps the polygamous in general could receive
heightened scrutiny. Nevertheless, as shown in Part III, the state’s compelling
250 See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that
classifications based on sexual orientation should receive heightened scrutiny). But see Davis v. Prison Health
Servs., 679 F.3d 433, 438 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying rational basis review to sexual-orientation classifications).
251 Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 146 (2011).
252 The argument could be made, however, that ignoring the polyamorous is a form of discrimination.
253 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
254 Id. at 538.
255 Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 546 (2004) (discussing
Moreno’s application of equal-protection rights to hippies).
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economic interests in maintaining monogamy would likely trump even
heightened review.
3. Animus
Similar to suspect-classification analysis is the analysis of animus, which
seeks to invalidate laws that are “born of animosity toward” a certain group.256
Animus is the catchall of suspected governmental discrimination against a
group, featuring legislation that cannot be conceived of by any other means
besides “an irrational prejudice.”257 While this is traditionally a rarely
successful argument in constitutional law, two of the 2014 challenges to
same-sex marriage laws overturned the law on the basis of animus towards
homosexuals.258
Animus is not likely to be successful as a vehicle for overturning polygamy
laws. While many states passed recent legislation aimed at maintaining
marriage’s status quo as between heterosexual partners, laws making marriage
a two-person endeavor have existed for centuries.259 It cannot seriously be
contended that these century-old laws were created with the specific purpose of
discriminating against the polygamous, though cohabitation laws may be a
different story and will be discussed in section C of this Part. Marriage-based
laws, however, seem to be safe from the threat of animus toward the
polygamous.
4. Rational Basis Review
With heightened review eliminated from consideration, the court’s analysis
of polygamy laws thus falls to rational basis review. All laws, at the very least,
must be “rationally related to furthering a legitimate state interest.”260 Under
rational basis review, courts are instructed to uphold laws so long as the law
plausibly advances a governmental objective, even if other less-restrictive

256
257
258

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634–35 (1996).
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985).
See Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 495 (9th Cir. 2014); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 666 (7th Cir.

2014).
259

The existence of normative monogamy has existed for centuries in the West. This is to be contrasted
with laws specifically banning polygamy, which did grow out of animus of Mormons to a large extent, as
shown in Part II. However, the animus contemplated with laws encouraging monogamy did not grow out of
such animus, as the West’s adoption of monogamy is the development relevant to animus analysis.
260 Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (quoting Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312
(1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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means to achieving the state interest are available.261 While this method of
review has been criticized for causing irrational legal and governance
results,262 the Court’s continued faith in rational basis review relies on its trust
that “even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic
process.”263 Thus, even if a court finds that a challenger’s right to plural
marriage is not fundamental and that the polyamorous are not a suspect class,
states still need to show a rational relationship between their polygamy laws
and their interest in limiting marriage to two people.
As we saw in Part III, states have a compelling interest in limiting the
participants in marriage to two. This means that, in order to satisfy rational
basis review, the state polygamy law needs only to be rationally related to the
interests described in Part III. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the
interest need not be “actually articulate[d] at any time.”264 Therefore, the
state’s economic interests in monogamy do not need to have been realized by
the legislature at the time of enactment of the polygamy laws, so long as they
are argued during the challenge.
While the traditional view of rational basis review—such as the view held
by Justice Thurgood Marshall—is that its invocation “leaves little doubt about
the outcome [because] the challenged legislation is always upheld,”265 at least
one recent decision suggests an alternative. When the Seventh Circuit
undertook its same-sex marriage challenge in Baskin v. Bogan, Judge Richard
Posner’s majority opinion applied rational basis review but found no rational
relationship between Indiana’s statute banning same-sex marriage and any
legitimate state interest.266 Judge Posner reviewed the potential reasons for
states to limit marriage to opposite-sex couples and concluded that the
261

Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 330 (1993).
See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 321 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing rational basis review “rudderless”
and “unpredictable” and arguing that “[a]ll interests not ‘fundamental’ and all cases not ‘suspect’ are not the
same; and it is time for the Court to drop the pretense that, for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, they
are”). See generally Neelum J. Wadhwani, Note, Rational Reviews, Irrational Results, 84 TEX. L. REV. 801
(2006) (outlining the ways in which rational basis review is “fundamentally flawed”).
263 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579–80 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)) (internal quotation mark omitted); FCC v. Beach
Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993) (quoting Vance, 440 U.S. at 97); see also DeBoer v. Snyder,
772 F.3d 388, 408 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that heterosexual-marriage laws meet rational basis review and that
same-sex marriage rights should be determined by the democratic process “from elected legislators, not
life-tenured judges”).
264 Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 (1992).
265 Murgia, 427 U.S. at 319 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
266 766 F.3d 648, 656 (7th Cir. 2014).
262
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proffered reasons are “so full of holes that [they] cannot be taken seriously.”267
Considering the issue in the context of child-welfare interests, Judge Posner
pointed out that many of the states’ proffered interests applied also to
heterosexual couples who were not able to reproduce, ultimately finding that
the laws banning same-sex marriage were “not ‘tailored’ to the problem.”268
“The discrimination against same-sex couples is irrational, and therefore
unconstitutional even if the discrimination is not subjected to heightened
scrutiny.”269
Is Judge Posner reintroducing a Justice Marshall style of rational basis
review? After all, “Judge Posner is a judicial, academic, and media star”270 and
was once determined to be the most-cited legal scholar in American history.271
Indeed, Judge Posner has the potential to upend entire areas of the law with his
creative and persuasive contributions to modern jurisprudence.272 This is an
important question to ask since, as we determined in the previous sections,
rational basis review will likely be the level of scrutiny applied to a
nonreligious polyamory challenge to polygamy laws. This means that the
constitutionality of restricting marriage to two persons may come down to

267 Id. At Baskin oral arguments, Judge Posner was exasperated by the states’ attorneys’ inability to show
any interest the states may have in retaining a heterosexual-marriage-only law, at one point quipping, “You
don’t have any sort of empirical or even conjectural basis for your law. Funny.” Dale Carpenter, The Posner
Treatment, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/
wp/2014/08/28/gay-marriage-bans-get-the-posner-treatment/.
268 Baskin, 766 F.3d at 672.
269 Id. at 656. Judge Posner went on to say that “[a] degree of arbitrariness is inherent in government
regulation, but when there is no justification for government’s treating a traditionally discriminated-against
group significantly worse than the dominant group in the society, doing so denies equal protection of the
laws.” Id. at 664.
270 Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Mr. Justice Posner? Unpacking the Statistics, 61 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 19, 20 (2005) (presenting quantitative research on Judge Posner’s reputation and influence).
271 Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal Scholars, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 409, 424 tbl.6 (2000). But see
Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, Essay, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time, 110 MICH. L.
REV. 1483 (2012) (presenting new methods of calculating contributions to legal scholarship, which drop Judge
Posner’s authority by excluding contributions made by book and to economics).
272 Choi & Gulati, supra note 270, at 20–21 (noting Judge Posner’s contributions to the fields of antitrust,
contracts, torts, discrimination, sexual harassment, evidence, intellectual property, and judicial behavior, along
with his “foundational scholarship in areas yet untapped by most legal academics”); see also Craig Green,
What Does Richard Posner Know About How Judges Think?, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 625, 625 (2010) (book
review) (“Richard Posner may be America’s most celebrated living judge, and although he does not sit on our
highest court, his career marks an unmatched fusion of judicial leadership and prolific scholarship.”); Martin
H. Redish, The Federal Courts, Judicial Restraint, and the Importance of Analyzing Legal Doctrine,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 1378, 1378 (1985) (book review) (“Posner may now rival [Roscoe] Pound and [Karl]
Llewellyn as the academic of the twentieth century who has most influenced the shape of legal thought.”).
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which version of rational basis review is applied, Posner’s or the traditional
method.
Under the traditional way of analyzing rational basis review, a challenge to
polygamy laws would surely fail. In Bostic v. Schaefer, the Fourth Circuit’s
2014 same-sex marriage challenge, the plaintiffs admitted that the state had a
legitimate interest in promoting family stability273 and in preventing
unforeseen social effects.274 This means that had that court applied rational
basis review to the constitutionality of laws banning same-sex marriage, the
plaintiffs’ admission of an interest almost certainly would have foreclosed
further challenge and upheld the law.275 Extending the rationale for same-sex
marriage laws being upheld under rational basis review, it seems that
polygamy laws would also be upheld as furthering a legitimate state interest.
Nearly identical interests could be espoused for states’ preference for both
monogamy and heterosexual marriage, though the interest in maintaining
monogamy is arguably even greater, as was discussed in Part III. No economic
justification for disallowing same-sex marriage can be reasonably espoused,
while a plethora of social science points to significant economic harms should
monogamy be abandoned.
Under Judge Posner’s version of rational basis review in Baskin, however,
a different result is entirely possible. Not surprisingly, Posner’s approach
appears to value empirical data over the generalized untargeted interests that
typically suffice in rational basis scrutiny. Posner is, after all, “one of the
fathers of the ‘law and economics’ movement.”276 This suggests that the key to
passing Posner’s version of rational basis review is to have an economically
273

Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 394 (4th Cir. 2014) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 395.
275 The court, however, found the plaintiffs’ challenge to involve a fundamental right and applied strict
scrutiny. Id. at 375–77 (majority opinion). The Ninth Circuit also indicated that their same-sex marriage
challenge would have resulted differently if rational basis review had been the standard. See Latta v. Otter,
771 F.3d 456, 464 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating that the District Court of Nevada’s application of rational basis
review in Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996 (D. Nev. 2012), allowed the upholding of Nevada’s law
banning same-sex marriage but that the Ninth Circuit’s subsequent decision to apply strict scrutiny changed
the result).
276 Choi & Gulati, supra note 270, at 20. Indeed, Posner literally wrote the book on the study of law and
economics. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (9th ed. 2014); see also William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1981) (explaining
economic forces in antitrust); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 1477 (1999) (explaining economic forces in evidence law); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of
the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193 (1985) (applying economic principles to criminal theory); Richard
A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1998) (defending
the use of rational-choice economics in law).
274
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rational reason for keeping the current form of the law. States, therefore, might
be required to present empirical evidence of the harms and benefits of
polyamory in order to meet this previously easy burden.277
On the other hand, Judge Posner’s application of rational basis review in
Baskin may just be another example of what makes Posner unique. Judge
Posner has been criticized for his ideas on how other judges should carry out
their task, with some concluding that Posner is simply an outlier in the sphere
of jurisprudence.278 It could very well be that Posner’s previously held
thoughts on the issue of same-sex marriage and gender equality made the issue
perfectly clear to him, but other judges, who have not written a book about the
regulation of marriage,279 may not find the issue to be decided as simply.
This possibility is supported by the Sixth Circuit’s same-sex marriage
opinion in DeBoer v. Snyder.280 DeBoer was decided after Posner’s Baskin
opinion, and DeBoer frequently cited to Baskin. Yet Judge Sutton, writing the
majority opinion in DeBoer, did not mention Judge Posner’s thoughts on the
applicability of rational basis review in same-sex marriage challenges. Judge
Sutton instead applied the traditional version of rational basis review and found
that the states had a plausible reason for maintaining heterosexual-only
marriage laws, thus meeting the required constitutional showing.281 Those
disapproving of a state law, according to Judge Sutton, must be a member of a
protected class, must be asserting a fundamental right, or must pursue
legislative avenues to changing the law.282 This is the hallmark of the
traditional rational basis approach. It therefore is highly likely that a court
following this approach to rational basis review in a polyamory challenge to
polygamy laws would find the state interests to be proper and uphold the laws.
The correct approach, according to DeBoer, would be through the democratic
policymaking process.283

277 The work by Professor Joseph Henrich discussed in Part III, however, should suffice as sufficient
economic rationale for maintaining monogamy restrictions on marriage. See Henrich et al., supra note 134.
278 Michael J. Gerhardt, How a Judge Thinks, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2185, 2204 (2009) (reviewing RICHARD
A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008)) (concluding that Posner’s perspective on judging “does not provide
much help or guidance on how judges other than Posner think” because of the vastly different approaches to
the law).
279 See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992).
280 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1040 (2015).
281 Id. at 407.
282 Id. at 402, 407–08.
283 See id. at 408.
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C. Cohabitation Laws: Brown v. Buhman
Typically, one would envision laws prohibiting polygamous marriage to
serve the same function as laws prohibiting polygamous cohabitation. After all,
cohabitation as a polyamorous group is functionally the same familial unit as
one seeking to be recognized by state authority. Indeed, the cohabitating
polyamorous group brings about the same undesirable effects on society as a
legally recognized polyamorous group. Thus, the compelling reasons discussed
in Part III of this Comment for preventing an actual, but not legally recognized,
polyamorous cohabitation arrangement are still valid. One would therefore
expect cohabitation laws to receive the same analysis as polygamy laws.
Yet a recent federal decision in Utah separated analysis of cohabitation
laws from polygamy laws and invalidated restrictions on cohabitation in
Brown v. Buhman.284 That decision relied heavily on Lawrence v. Texas’s
invalidation of sodomy laws285 and found that intra-house restriction on
intimate conduct infringed upon a fundamental liberty interest and therefore
required heightened scrutiny.286 However, the Utah federal court boldly stated
that Utah’s cohabitation requirement could not withstand even rational basis
review because of a lack of a state interest in prohibiting cohabitation.287 Judge
Clark Waddoups, finding the cohabitation statute to do little more than regulate
sexual conduct, considered and dismissed potential state interests relating to
policing closed religious communities and marriage fraud and ultimately held
that no state interest was present.
Judge Waddoups, however, did not consider potential state interest
regarding increased societal crime resulting from large pools of unmarried
men, the potential for harm or a lack of nurturing of children reared in
polygamous homes, or the economic benefits derived from normative
monogamy because the state did not raise any of these points.288 Instead, the
state focused its defense on crimes that are characteristic in polygynous
communities, choosing to tell stories of Warren Jeffs and the Kingston brothers
instead of social science research into the harms of polygamy.289 Judge
Waddoups had no choice but to decide the case on the arguments before his
court.
284
285
286
287
288
289

947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013).
539 U.S. 558, 564–79 (2003).
Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1202.
Id. at 1202, 1222–23.
See, e.g., Defendant’s Reply Memorandum, supra note 202.
Id.
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Future courts considering cohabitation laws, however, should not be bound
by the rationale of Buhman. Its lack of consideration of the state’s compelling
interests described in Part III forecloses its analytical value. Instead, future
courts (and those arguing before the court) should rely on the social science
presented in Part III and uphold restrictions on cohabitation because of the
same societal-level concerns regarding the behavioral incentives of males not
practicing monogamy. The economic detriments are the same to society
regardless of legal recognition of the relationship.
CONCLUSION
It is curious that courts and scholars considering the legality of laws
favoring monogamy have yet to acknowledge the abundance of social science
research on the effects of polygamy. Instead, they continue to recite the tired
old stories of polygyny-based coercion and crime as their broad-based
justification for maintaining monogamy. In doing so, they ignore several
extremely compelling justifications for the continuance of normative
monogamy and thus shortchange the paradigm that has enabled much of
Western society’s progress.
Normative monogamy represents more than just some instinctive,
un-theorized notion that monogamy is the standard that we like. Instead,
monogamy artfully distributes marriage equally along gender lines, reducing
the gender gap and alleviating the incentive for men to commit risky and
criminal activities as a means to attract a mate. Monogamy increases the
likelihood that homes will be peaceful, protecting children from the dangers
inherent in living with unrelated adults. And, most importantly, monogamy
encourages men to channel their efforts from mate-seeking to more productive
means, like education and long-term business investments. The aggregate
economic benefit from normative monogamy produces previously
uncontemplated results that spur societal prosperity and progress.
These compelling interests should suffice against any level of judicial
review. Even so, this Comment has shown that the right to control the number
of persons in a marriage should not receive heightened scrutiny because the
fundamental right to marry cannot be extended to a fundamental right to marry
multiple persons. Therefore, courts should apply rational basis review to
polygamy laws, and the states have more than adequate state interests to meet
this level of scrutiny.
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Too often, courts and legal scholars blur the lines between constitutional
rationales and policy concerns to achieve their desired results. But not every
desired social change has its basis in legal rights. History is littered with great
examples of the courts protecting the constitutional rights of some against the
will of the many, but that does not mean that the same analysis is appropriate
in all cases. Indeed, some instances of desired social change do not impact any
protected constitutional right, and those changes instead must come through
the political process instead of the courts.
The push to expand marriage to include the polyamorous is one of those
desired changes that is best suited for consideration by states’ political
processes. Challenges to polygamy laws do not ask for equality but rather for
the overhaul of the Western household. That overhaul may one day become
prudent as a political choice should future research on the social science
discussed in this Comment show the societal benefits of polyamory outweigh
the costs of abandoning monogamy. For now, however, courts and legal
scholars should appreciate the role of normative monogamy in the story of
Western development and continue adhering to monogamy as the marital
paradigm that has enabled our society’s progress.
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